Nonviolent Strategies for Social Change

Is strategy a buzzword within nonviolent social movements? I ask myself this question since at social movements meetings I repeatedly hear: "We need to be strategic" or "Why are people not interested in strategy?" In changing a certain problem, is having a clear strategy the key factor in what movements can achieve? If so, then what makes that a good strategy? And what helps groups develop such strategies? These are some questions we have been asking ourselves for many years at War Resisters' International.

First, what do we mean by strategy? People see strategy in many different ways. Firstly, there is a distinction between strategy and tactics, WRi's Handbook for Nonviolent Campaigns says: "Tactics are the actual means used to gain an objective, while strategy is the overall campaign plan, which may involve complex operational patterns, activity, and decision-making that lead to tactical execution. Strategy is a long-term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. Strategy is differentiated from a tactic or immediate actions with resources at hand because it is extensively premeditated and often practically rehearsed. Strategies are used to make the problem or problems easier to understand and solve". This is a linear approach where the key word is planning: you plan each steps.

Marshall Ganz suggests a less linear approach, arguing "Strategy is how we turn what we have into what we need to get what we want. It is how we transform our resources into the power to achieve our purposes. It is the conceptual link we make between the targeting, timing, and tactics with which we mobilise and deploy resources and the outcomes we hope to achieve".

There are many definitions of strategy and they work differently for different purposes. Often the starting point for a strategy is to look at what we can do to bring about change, which is connected to our motivations and what is possible. This will define several aspects of your strategy: what your goals are, what your message is, who you target, what tactics you implement, etc. Making it into a plan might increase effectiveness, but campaigns needs to be flexible: creating newsworthy actions, to attract interest from other people, and perhaps to wrong foot opposition.

At a recent strategy training gathering, we were asked to name our most and less strategical experience in a group. Some of the shared characteristics in the less strategical experiences were: unclear goals, lack of involvement of participants, lack of creativity, conflicting interests and no clear decision making structure. The most strategical experiences included: high levels of creativity, containing a surprise factor, mobilising large numbers of people, with had clear targets at the right time, with strong commitment and good decision making structures.

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How change happens

Much has been written about what drives change in certain circumstances: do structural conditions mean that change would happen anyway, or is the strategy of the movement the main force behind the change? In their book “Why Civil Resistance Works” Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan say that “voluntaristic features of campaigns, notably those related to the skill of the resisters, are often better predictors of success than structural determinants”. They argue that nonviolent movements have been effective in a wide range of contexts - from the most repressive to most open societies - so change depends primarily on the strength of the movement. This echoes Marshall Ganz who claims that “although learning about how the environment influences actors is important, learning more about how actors influence the environment is the first step not only to understand the world but to change it”. This means that strategy doesn’t work in isolation. A clear understanding of your environment is key to determining your strategy. A crucial element is having the capacity to identify openings or cracks in the system, and having the right strategy exploit these opportunities – some times strategies also create this opening. A good strategy on its own is not enough, you need people to implement such strategy.

Chenoweth and Stephan in “Why Civil Resistance Works” - which argues that in the last century nonviolent movements have been more successful than violent ones - say that the key for this success has been the capacity for nonviolent movements to become mass movements, as the level of risk, skills etc, are much lower than in violent movements. One argument about nonviolent action is that everyone can join in! Does one of the strategic goal need to be building a mass movement? Can change happen without large mobilisations? What role groups such War Resisters’ International, which usually doesn’t mobilise huge masses of people, play to bring about change?

In one of the best known social movement models, Bill Moyers’s Movement Action Plan (MAP), argues that for a movement to be successful there are four roles that groups or individual need to play - we can not all be or do the same. These four roles are the rebel, reformers, citizens and the change agent. MAP suggests that most social movements go through eight different stages: business as usual, failure of established channels, ripening conditions, take off, perception of failure, winning over the majority, success, consolidation of success and moving over to other struggles. Different groups and people can play bigger roles in particular moments. For example, in WRI different groups play different roles: many see themselves as the rebel, regarding nonviolent actions as a way to draw attention to a problem. At the same time WRI, often does the silent work of supporting each other in particular, when situations seem quiet but actually a lot of ground work is done. For example by providing training to grassroot groups, helping them to work together, and planning a campaign or preparing for action. Often, these groups are the initiators of what later might become mass movements. At WRI we do what we do, first and foremost because is what we believe in, but also because of our profound conviction in revolutionary nonviolence. For WRI, our principles are key to our strategy.

Training and strategy

In recent years the Nonviolence Programme of WRI has created resources and lead nonviolence trainings to help people in their nonviolent campaigns, empowering them to take action. We believe that training and planning aids strategy. Sometimes the outcomes of a training are not clear immediately, but it often empowers groups, and when the time is ripe they have the skills to come up with good strategies.

In 2012 WRI helped organise two regional training exchanges. Sharing experiences can motivate you to take action, not to copy what others have done but to inspire you to think outside of the box.

The first exchange was in South Africa, and had a focus on nonviolence struggles. At this exchange the main need from participants was to share their experiences of struggle, to learn how people in different parts of Africa have used nonviolence as their means of struggle. The key was to visualise this share identity, showing how our identity is fundamental when thinking of developing strategies.

The second took place in Belgium, bringing together nearly 40 trainers from around Europe. We explored how as trainers we can facilitate groups working on strategy, or even just getting people to start thinking about strategy. There were sessions looking at social movement and strategy theory and the current situation of movements in Europe, but clearly the biggest interest in the group was looking at how training can facilitate group process, as this is a key component for developing good strategies. For example at the meeting someone said that they often get requests for campaign development training - to help a group move forward - but that as trainers they realise that the problem is not related to campaigning, but about group dynamics: the group is not working well together. At times, it felt that the message was that a healthy group is as good as a strategically-minded one; but is that enough? There is no question that a starting point for any work for social change is that a group works well together. Then the question is: is the main contribution that a trainer can give to a group to help them work better together? This could be seen as one of, or the main contributions training, because if a group can work well together, they are more likely to come up with a shared analysis of the situation - an understanding of the context and a vision of what you want to change. They may also set long and short term goals, alongside a plan of how to reach them whilst maintaining enough flexibility to change the plan according to the conditions faced. There are training tools that help you in each of these steps, and trainers can share and facilitate them, but it is better if they come from the group.

There is no magic answer to what enables a group to strategically bring about change. Different groups work differently and contexts vary. As trainers, we know that one tool that works well with one group might not work at all in another - one effective tactic in one setting can be counterproductive in another. If there is one thing I have learned, it is that learning from each other, by sharing our experiences can be immensely inspiring and can also lead to action. At WRI we will continue bringing people together to get inspired and support each other, knowing that we can not replace the work of the group itself, but may help to bring closer together our paths for change.

Javier Gárate
Using Social Movement Theory for Movements in Action

The purpose of this article is to remind us that Social Movement Research can help actual movements coming to terms with certain issues of their struggles and a better understanding of themselves and their strategies.

Over the last decades Social Movement Research has established itself as a distinct discipline within the Social Sciences. And while it might be true that scholars pursuing their task of understanding or explaining social movements have become somehow detached from the “real life” experiences of people “out there” on the streets, in the blockades or in their group-meetings, the findings of their research might nevertheless give some insights for practical application.

When asking people who do training work in Nonviolent campaigns which theoretical concepts of social movements they know many will mention Bill Moyer’s Movement Action Plan (MAP), which is based on experiences and case studies of various movements. However, there are other – more “scientific” - models and concepts around, which have been subject to debate amongst scholars of Social Movement Research. And it is surprising how little even these core concepts are known in the sphere of activism. However, it must be mentioned that these theories aim to explain the formation or development of movements and are not intending to guideline practical action – although knowing them might be useful when doing so. The following paragraphs will introduce the most common theoretical approaches (which implies that there are many more...).

Resource Mobilisation

According to resource mobilization theory, a movement can’t develop, nor succeed without resources - with time and money people are willing to give in support of a movement being the most important resources. Thus there is a need for a group of people and certain structures within a movement which work towards bringing money, supporters, attention of the media, alliances with those in power, and refining the organizational structure. Social movements need these resources to be effective, because dissent and grievances alone will not generate social change.

Political Opportunities

Political opportunity theory argues that the actions of the activists are dependent on the existence - or lack of - of a specific political opportunity. Political opportunity refers to the receptivity or vulnerability of the existing political system to challenge. This vulnerability can be the result of a growth of political pluralism, a decline in effectiveness of repression, an elite disunity (i.e.the leading factions are internally fragmented, a broadening of access to institutional participation in political processes and/or support of organized opposition by elites.

In the dynamic type of the political opportunity approach – sometimes also called political process approach – the changes in the political opportunity structures (in a country) are taken into account for explaining the formation or development of a social movement.

Framing

The concept of Framing refers to the development and proclamation a specific pattern of meaning which is being constructed by a social movement to explain a conflict, the goals of their campaign and their approach to action. The framing approach states that the quality of their framing is key to a movement’s success, resource mobilisation being a part thereof.

So, how can these concepts be of relevance for practical work?

The question of Resources probably is most common when it comes to planning a campaign or action: the initial campaign group will ask themselves what it will take to achieve an aim. The task of setting achievable goals itself has a lot to do with assessing their own resources. Also, the character of a campaign might be determined by a critical assessment of the resource base – i.e. rather than trying a protest march with a small number of people and experience a feeling of relative failure, it might be decided to start with an awareness-raising campaign and later expand it to a mobilization campaign – and eventually, when the resource base seems to be strong enough, the campaign might seek confrontation.

Identifying Political Opportunities is a task which some activists have troubles to come to terms with. Maybe this is, because in many instances it means to look deeper into the real world of political decision-making which doesn’t look very appealing for grass-roots activists.

And maybe also, because most of the times the predictable and ritualised processes of policy-making don’t give much space for action from outside the politico-economic power-structures. One basic insight the approach might give is to be aware that there are conditions which are outside the influence of social movements and that activists are invited not to ignore those opportunity structures but to consider them when choosing their issues, types of action and definition of goals. However, crucial to the behavior of people and social movement organisations is not reality as such but the way social movements make sense of it.

The real challenge lies in identifying those issues which are controversial both within society but potentially amongst elites – and then, when there comes the particular moment in time, be quick and get your campaign ready. Ironically, or sadly, often those “Windows of Opportunity” open up when disasters happen or a scandal breaks: e.g. recently the horrible disaster of Fukushima served as the ultimate trigger for the German Anti-nuclear movement to press for a return to the decision to phase out nuclear power plants. Clearly, this would not have happened without the groundwork being laid in decades of grass-roots campaigning and established networks who were ready to organise marches and protest events within a few days.

Last, to develop a proper Frame for a campaign is key to it’s success. According to theory a “master frame” consists of three components:

- First, the diagnostic frame consists of the problem definition. Here it is being described what really is the core of the problem, why this is and who is responsible for it. Part of the diagnostic framing should be an appropriate and recognizable name, an identification scheme and a problem description as well as criteria for assessment and the assessment itself.

- Second, the prognostic framing develops an understanding of how, by whom and by which means the problem identified can be resolved. Important is not only to have an abstract problem solution, but also concrete guidelines for action.

- Third, the motivational framing looks at the interlinkages between the problem and the individual person and presents incentives or motivation to participate in or support the campaign.

The mobilising power of the frame rests on these three components and their interplay. If it is done well the frame can and has to be used repeatedly for producing all kinds of mobilising materials, speaking to the media, reaching out to allies etc.

To sum up: looking at theory can give new insights for practical action – and inform debates on strategy.

Rasmus Grobe
In 2010, a convoy of six ships called the Freedom Flotilla set out to challenge the blockade of Gaza, posing a considerable dilemma for the Israeli authorities. On board the ships were around 700 unarmed civilians from around the world, including some well known personalities, like the Swedish crime novelist Henning Mankell and parliamentarians from a number of countries. In addition to the passengers and representatives from the media, the ships also carried 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, such as building materials and medical equipment like X-ray machines and ultrasound scanners.

The long journey meant that the pressure built while the ships approached Gaza, making this a drama for the world to watch.

The Freedom Flotilla is a good example of a dilemma action, a type of nonviolent direct action that forces the opponents to make a choice between responses that are equally bad from their point of view.

US nonviolent activist George Lakey in his book Powerful Peacemaking was the first to write about what he called “dilemma demonstrations.” He presented the dilemma as between two options for authorities: either let protesters continue with their demonstration, which would achieve an immediate goal, or use force to stop them, thereby revealing their harsh side and generating popular concern.

Brian Martin and I decided to approach the issue of dilemma actions systematically in a small research project. We looked at a number of cases, including the freedom flotilla, in order to identify the core characteristics of a dilemma action. We found that the essential feature of a dilemma action is that the opponent has no obvious best response. The most attractive responses have mixes of advantages and disadvantages that are not directly comparable, as assessed at the time or in hindsight. Many nonviolent actions are reactions to what authorities or multinational companies do: activists respond to agendas set by others. In dilemma actions, activists are proactive.

Most nonviolent actions never impose a dilemma. Take a conventional expression of social concern, such as an antwar rally on Hiroshima Day in a liberal democracy: authorities may tolerate or even facilitate the event because it poses little threat to vested interests, whereas banning it would arouse antagonism. Some forms of civil disobedience, such as ploughshares actions involving damaging military equipment, also pose no dilemma, because authorities know exactly what to do: arrest the activists, who willingly surrender to police. Nevertheless, we think it is more useful to think of dilemma actions as a matter of degree rather than dichotomously present or absent.

The dilemma the activists from the Freedom Flotilla created at first sight has two “solutions”: either let the ships arrive in Gaza with their passengers and cargo, which in the eyes of many Israeli citizens would mean giving in to pressure. The other option was to stop the vessels, and in that case the next dilemma arose: what means should be used, and when? In the end, commando soldiers from the Israeli Defense Force attacked early in the morning on 31 May 2010, while the ships were still in international waters. On board the Mavi Marmara, nine Turkish citizens were killed, some of them shot dead at close range. The killings created an enormous public relations disaster for the Israeli government, and were condemned around the world. The use of force backfired on the Israeli government despite its efforts to inhibit public outrage. Many governments summoned the Israeli ambassadors or recalled their own. The relationship with the Turkish government, for decades one of the Israeli government’s few allies in the Middle East, was damaged for more than a year. Although the Obama administration in the United States was very restrained in its reactions, it expressed criticism of the Israeli government. A UN commission was established to investigate the attacks, and in August 2011 reached the controversial conclusion that the blockade of Gaza was not illegal, but that the use of force had been excessive and unreasonable.

Dilemma actions provide one approach for increasing the effectiveness of nonviolent-action strategies. Knowing more about the dynamics of dilemma actions can enable activists to design their actions to pose difficult dilemmas to opponents, leading opponents to make inferior decisions or waste their efforts preparing for several possible responses.

Within the freedom flotilla movement there has been discussion about how to make the dilemma from 2010 even more difficult. The following year, the campaign planned to repeat the journey, and 12 ships were ready to travel towards Gaza, 10 of them from Greek waters. More ships with passengers from even more countries were chosen as a means for raising the pressure.

However, the Israeli government avoided a repeat of the 2010 scenario by using more subtle ways of stopping the ships. They cultivated relationships with the Greek government, and launched a successful diplomatic offensive which resulted in UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon calling on all governments to urge their citizens not to participate in a second flotilla. The Greek authorities banned the ships from leaving their ports; those that attempted to leave anyway were intercepted by the Greek coast guard. Two of the ships had similar propeller damage, leading to suspicion that they had been sabotaged by the Israeli secret service. The Turkish authorities also prevented the Mavi Marmara from leaving Turkey—in spite of the Turkish government’s criticism of the blockade of Gaza. Only one ship, leaving from France, was boarded by Israeli commando soldiers and no one was killed.

These events prevented a
potential public relations disaster for the Israeli government. The Israeli authorities, by proactive lobbying, dealt with the potential dilemma before it landed on their doorstep. They managed to make it an issue about permissions to leave ports. Bureaucratic obstacles are far less newsworthy than a military attack in international waters.

The 2011 attempt to break the blockade clearly shows how difficult it is to foresee what an opponent facing a dilemma will do when actions and reactions are not routine. The activists had prepared for many different Israeli government reactions, but not foreseen the possibility of bureaucratic obstacles of this kind. One way to surmount such obstacles would have been for the ships to start from different ports in different countries. However, this would have increased the organizational challenge of arriving in Gaza at the same time. It could have been a way of establishing the dilemma over a longer period of time, thereby increasing the pressure; however, it might have been easier to stop them separately using force, without the media drama of the first journey.

In addition to the core feature of a dilemma action, we were able to identify five factors frequently found in actual dilemma actions that add to the difficulty in making choices. At the outset we suspected that some of these would be a necessary part of a dilemma action, but looking at a number of cases revealed that they were not. Nevertheless, these factors can add to the dilemma: (1) the action has a constructive, positive element; (2) activists use surprise or unpredictability; and (3) opponents' prime choices are in different domains. Different domains mean that the consequences are not readily compared, for example when one choice has ideological consequences and another has political consequences. Dilemma actions can also construct a timing that (4) appeals to mass media coverage, making it difficult for authorities to ignore them and (5) appeal to widely held beliefs within society. These factors contribute to making the dilemma more difficult to "solve;" but are not essential in constructing it. Governments and their agents, such as police and prison officials are often those who are forced to deal with dilemmas. However, this is not a core feature of a dilemma action, since it can be directed towards private companies, for example banks or other financial institutions as well.

Stellan Vinthagen, nonviolent scholar and activist and himself on board the ship to Gaza in 2012 has written that two aspects of the 2010 flotilla combined to make this a more powerful dilemma action compared to previous attempts of breaking the blockade: (1) it was ordinary humanitarian assistance, not just symbolic amounts, and (2) the delivery by ship meant that the activists were not depending on the Israeli authorities in order to break the blockade. Vinthagen writes: “A ship is not "on its way" to do an action. The departure itself marks the beginning of the action: the challenge of the blockade. The action had already been going on for several days before Israel had a realistic chance of stopping it.”

Nonviolent Strategies

'Conscription' is a multimedia installation, by Caglar Kimyoncu, inspired by stories from Turkey exploring the call-up to military service for people who don’t ‘fit the mould’. A Latin proverb used to send a clear warning: ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’ (Si vis pacem, para bellum). Its power hasn’t subsided. In the name of this ‘peace’, seemingly liberal and tolerant societies perpetuate a state of coercion through compulsory military service. Judgements are made about ‘fitness’ and ‘suitability’ for an ultimate - still undefined - goal. Where do human rights, individual choice, freedom and dignity fit into this picture?

Conscription comes to East London in May, aiming to encourage people from all sections of society to search for answers: Four individuals meet at a military hospital - the subjects under assessment, and their doctor. A four-channel film follows their characters and stories, as these emerge through the imposed intimacy of the hospital ward to create a compelling, thought-provoking and dramatic multimedia installation at the Old Truman Brewery. A military hospital room is reconstructed at the exhibition space, making the visitor feel like an unseen protagonist. Avoiding a judgemental or prescriptive approach, the visitor is prompted to explore the position of the individual within the social system, and what it means for the two to be at odds.

Conscription is the first project in ‘Conscientious Objectors’, a series of collaborative research-based focusing on countries which use conscription and national service.

Conscientious Objection as a Strategy

Conscientious objection is perhaps more often seen as a moral imperative than as a strategy. However, in countries with active conscription, there can be different ways of avoiding or delaying military service. Some people gain a medical discharge. Others flee, emigrate, choose professions that are exempt from call up, or bribe officials.

The choice to publicly declare oneself a conscientious objector, and, in some cases, face the persecution that follows, can be a consciously embraced political strategy, often based on antimilitarist principles. This choice is sometimes taken by individuals; often, it is taken by a collective of like-minded people who campaign together. We asked Boro Kitanoski and Igor Seke, conscientious objectors from Macedonia and Serbia respectively, what steps their movements took when they had made that choice.

From the margins to the mainstream by Igor Seke

The campaign for conscientious objection in Serbia was always a matter of a small group of people. The movement developed on the political and cultural margins of Serbian society during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Feminist groups were the first to openly support not only to those who refused to perform military service, but also to deserters from the Yugoslav wars. In the beginning, men only got involved in a campaign that should have primarily concerned them (as the objects of conscription) through participation in the activities of the feminist groups, initially through Women in Black. That was a great help, as the feminists already had a clear idea of what kind of change they wanted to see in the society: antimilitarism was part of this.

The social-political context we faced during the campaign made things harder: nationalism, militarism, homophobia, intolerance of smaller religious groups, etc. were pushing all of us to the margins. We felt we had a very limited space for action. Conscientious objection was seen as a stance of “drug addicts, gays and sect members”, and parents literally warned their children against it. When asked about drug addicts, gays and members of small religious groups we always said that yes, we have all of them among the campaign members, just as the army and police does. We highlighted that we were an inclusive not exclusive movement.

The campaign had a very limited objective: ending conscription in Serbia. Although there wasn’t a substitute civilian service, our plan was to get a law that would free imprisoned objectors (10 Jehovah’s Witnesses were still in prison in 2002), and that would allow young people to refuse military service. Knowing how little the state would care about the alternative service, we saw, as the government did, that every objector is one soldier less for the Army. We hoped to create a critical mass of objectors that would make conscription too hard to maintain.

Actions at the local level attempted to “demystify” conscientious objection. In a society that feared the unknown, the only way to accept something is to get to know it. We needed allies, and were lucky to get a journalist from an independent newspaper interested in the issue. As it was a provocative subject, other journalists followed, and we had all the media coverage we needed. During a debate on national Radio Belgrade with a Chief of the PR Service of the Serbian Army, I was asked “How did the campaign for conscientious objection manage to win the media war against the Army?” We weren’t at war with anyone; it was just the power of well-presented arguments against military propaganda based on fear that got CO more popular than military service.

To mount political pressure, we had two lines of action: national and international. On the national level, we collected 30,000 signatures for the Law on Conscientious Objection. The signatures were mainly collected in the streets and in universities. This made the Student Union one of our main partners in the campaign. At the international level, with support of WRI, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection and Amnesty International, we managed to put the issue of CO high on the agenda of the Serbian government. For this, we used two concrete cases: two declared objectors were offered an unarmed military service and one of them accepted it. The other (myself) refused, and that’s when the international support network did the best it can do: there were over 500 protest letters from all over the world sent to the Serbian government in a matter of days. They had to release me. One year later, the government approved a law on conscientious objection.

Out of about 10,000 people called up, 220 declared their objection and started their alternative service on 22nd December 2003. In 2006, the number of objectors was higher than the number of those who didn’t object. 1st January 2011 Serbia ended conscription, officially calling it a “suspension”.

In 2002, when we had a meeting with a representative of the Council of Europe in Belgrade, asking for their support in political pressure on the Serbian government we were literally told: “CO in Serbia? Maybe in 2010”. The last day of 2010 was the last day of conscription.

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Negotiating the insider outsider terrain as a solidarity educator in the West Papua freedom movement

In a recent article (Rayfield and Morello 2012) a colleague, Rennie Morello and I wrestled with our outsider/insider identities as we facilitated nonviolent training and education with and for West Papuan activists longing for freedom. We wrote:

In some sense we might have once identified ourselves as outsiders to the movement offering support “in solidarity”. But over time the movement has stirred-up trouble for us and our insider-outsider identities. We work in solidarity with Papuan activists in their struggle for self-determination, but we are not Papuan. In this way we are cultural outsiders. More importantly, while we attempt to share the risks and costs of working for peace and justice in West Papua, we will never pay the same price as Papuan activists. In this way, we are political outsiders. Connected to this is our commitment to non-interference – Papuan activists themselves must determine the strategic direction and tactical choices of the movement. In this way we are movement outsiders.

But this is not the whole story. We have a moral and political responsibility to support Papuan aspirations for self-determination. Our own country’s government, companies and citizens help enable the occupation and benefit politically and economically from it. So we have a responsibility to change this situation. In this sense we are movement insiders.

Rennie is Sicilian Australian with Cornish and Maori heritage and I (Alex) am a White Australian of English, Scottish and Polish decent. We were born into global privilege and live in the global North. In 2011 we were joined by another ‘outsider’, an activist educator and scholar from the USA. The facilitation team includes several West Papuan educators – Papuans living in the Diaspora, in West Papua or Indonesia and Papuans from Papuan New Guinea. Our desire is to maximise the effectiveness of Papuan activists by nurturing the growth of a self-sustaining and Papuan-led network of movement facilitators. We do this by providing training and education at the request of Papuan activists around themes of civil resistance, strategy, movement building, resilience in the face of repression, campaign communication, and training educators. We are committed to the goal of freedom (broadly defined) for West Papua - a Melanesian nation in waiting occupied by the Indonesian military.

There are tensions inherent in providing solidarity to an indigenous-led self-determination struggle as a ‘sometimes/always’ ‘outsider’ who is other-than-Indigenous. I say ‘sometimes/always’ because although I am sometimes considered an ‘insider’ I can never completely deny my ‘outsider’ status. By activist education I mean “education [that] is conducted by and with activists, is openly interested in the processes of change-making, and utilises education to create justice-oriented social change” (La

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With the end of the conscription, the campaing died. Antimilitarism is again at the margins of the society. Maybe we could have done more to bring about a profound change in the society, maybe we missed that chance. Whilst there are armies in the Balkans, and in the rest of the world, we should not sit and relax. The war is still going on in the heads of many in this region, and a strong anti-militarist campaign is a political necessity for the sake of the Balkans.

Conscientious objection as a tool, not a goal by Boro Kitanoski

The first group of ideological conscientious objectors (COs) in Macedonia was formed in the mid ’90s and came from an alternative subculture. Until then, a silent martyr of the military conscript system was the small group of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Their members were regularly tried and sent to jail, repeatedly (one individual was tried 7 times). But in public, there was complete silence on the issue. Sometimes, it was considered part of the discrimination against a small religious minority, and that as not surprising. Macedonia seceded peacefully from Yugoslavia in early ’90s (and was the only state that gained independence without war) and had an internationally accepted aura of small peace-loving country in a very troubled Balkan of the ’90s. In reality, it was highly troubled society that had just come out of a big federation, had a small army, but kept the old Yugoslav military mindset. This, unfortunately, had its tragic climax in the war conflict of 2001.

We were a very, very young group of friends, who just didn’t want to go to the army. That was the basic common ground, but we also, from the very beginning, had an antimilitarist approach. CO for us was a tool, not a goal. We refused to see the issue from a human rights perspective only or to put the issue into a ‘European integration’ framework and wait for reforms to come: we always defined it as part of the global antimilitarist struggle.

Now as I look back, I realise that the biggest advances were made on a human rights levels, but at the same time, we would have never got there if we didn’t had the far goal and identity of our struggle. The public was ignoring the issue until people showed up on streets. Draft evasion was always at 20-30%. Now, regional wars, system failure and robbery during privatization were all contributing to a general rejection of the military, and we were aware of it. The problem was to empower and bring people into the public sphere.

It is strange, but the first mention of the CO in the Defence Law was in 2001, although the first ideas about abolishing conscription were set for 2010 or 2012. Civilian service was initiated in 2003 with a couple of COs undertaking it. The government were putting all kinds of pressure on COs: refusing to accept declarations, very changeable approaches to the law, prosecutions, different treatments for ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians - everything you can think of. We responded by being active in most big towns and offering support to COs bringing their refusal to the Ministry of Defence.

A government study claimed that there would be no more than 15 COs. In fact, in 2004 there were 1,000 and that number was growing. We were confident in the unpopularity of the service, and used this. We were counting on two things: the stubbornness of a military that did not want to stop using oppressive measures, and that a growing number of COs (whether they performed the alternative service or not) would in the end cause the military/alternative service system to break itself apart. It happened. In the following 2 years, the number of CO declarations grew and in 2006 there were more COs than conscripts who accepted military service. In March 2006, the Government finally declared end of conscription, way before planned, mentioning the number of COs (wasting our money and not contributing to our defence) as a small part of the decision.
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Rocca and Whelan 2005). Four things have transformed our activist education work into ‘solidarity education’:

• Our embedded relationships in the movement. In a sense we have become a part of the movement we work with. Like the Papuan activists we work with, we care passionately about decolonisation and self-determination, as the indigenous colleagues we work with.

• The complex and shifting insider-outsider relationship invokes the solidarity quality to the activist education project we undertake. As facilitators who are not Papuan we will never shed our outside status or the rank and privilege that protects and enables us to do the work we do. At the same time we are committed to sharing the risks and costs of this work in solidarity with our Papuan colleagues.

• The desire to make sure our education and training work assists Papuan activists to achieve social changes as they define them, and to take action in our own countries to change the way our own countries help maintain the occupation.

• A focus on building the strategic capacity of the Papuan freedom movement by strengthening the ability of diverse Papuan political and cultural groups to work effectively together, increasing access to salient knowledge and cultivating a commitment to ongoing learning and reflection.

Negotiating the insider/outside terrain is complicated. As I travel this journey of solidarity education I am assisted by five key principles: self-determination, responsibility, nonviolent action, nonpartisanship and non-interference. These function as navigational aids to negotiate the tricky inside/outside terrain inside the Papuan freedom movement.

Self-determination: In the specific case of the West Papuan struggle for freedom it is important that ‘outsiders’ like myself continually acknowledge that Papuans themselves are already taking the lead around making change. In the solidarity education work my colleagues and I undertake self-determination exists as an ideal, process, and outcome. It is the taproot to all other rights and one that needs to animate our training and education work. As an ideal, self-determination refers to the realisation of the collective aspirations of indigenous peoples living within defined cultural, linguistic and geographic territories and the ability of those peoples and groups to fully participate in the decisions that affect their lives. That includes directing the solidarity education project. As a process, self-determination refers to the difficult, contested and ongoing practice of securing, maintaining and fulfilling desires for political, economic, social, and cultural rights that impact on people’s and groups’ abilities to determine their own future.

Solidarity education assists this by providing the space and skills and knowledge for Papuans to explore how to realise the multiple strands of self-determination. As an outcome, self-determination refers to the claim to the right of self-government within the boundaries of a given territory. Many West Papuans argue this requires a referendum over West Papua’s political status. However, localised demands for self-determination can also be translated into demands for greater administrative and legislative rule, local indigenous control over land and resources, the ability to define and direct development activity, including the right to say “no to development” (and the right to say “yes”), and the freedom to express distinct cultural and religious identities and forms of governance. In the context of solidarity education support for self-determination as an ideal, process and outcome is about aligning education content and processes with Papuan led visions and strategies in pursuit of real and tangible benefits for Papuans. Sometimes that is difficult when an individual, group or even the movement wishes to pursue a direction, goal, or vision that challenges my own political analysis and ideological leanings.

Responsibility: In a recent Facebook posting to the Australian West Papua Association list Leonie Tangahama, a West Papuan leader living in the Netherlands, reminded ‘outsiders’ on that list that our role is not ‘help’ or ‘offer support’. Ms. Tangahama wrote:

West Papuans are not begging for help. They are giving the international community an opportunity to redeem itself by making things right again in that part of the world where it made a big mistake. Take that opportunity, International Community. It will save you from having to explain to your children and grandchildren why a slow-motion genocide to happen to this Melanesian people, the people of West Papua. Accept this offer, don’t think of yourselves as the ones giving help. We are the ones helping you, to cleanse your souls.

Ms. Tangahama is echoing the words of Lila Watson, an Australian Aboriginal elder: “If you have come to help me, you are wasting your time, but if your liberation is tied up with mine, then we can work together.” As an outsider Australian working with West Papuans I need to ensure that I am also addressing ongoing practices of colonisation in my own country and constantly reflect on and work to change the ways the Australian government and corporations exploit Papuan resources, export violence through training and arming the Indonesian military, and seek to silence Papuan voices for change.

Nonviolent action: We only work with individuals and groups who use or want to use nonviolent means to address grievances and realise their ambitions for peace. At times we also work with members of the armed struggle who want to explore nonviolent tactics and strategy. We encourage vigorous debate amongst participants concerning the means through which the struggle should be waged and the consequences of using different approaches to social change: violent action, nonviolent action, a mixture of violent and nonviolent action, and conventional political processes. We are upfront about our own commitments to a strategic application of nonviolent action.

Nonpartisanship: Although we are partisan to the goals of peace, justice and environmental sustainability, we are nonpartisan in the sense that we don’t align ourselves with any particular Papuan faction within the movement for self-determination. We are guided by the belief, that as non-Papuans, our role is not to support one group over another. Instead we seek to support all groups working nonviolently for a just peace and intentionally create space for groups to forge relationships of trust across political, cultural, geographic, economic and social fratures.

Noninterference: As an ‘outside’ solidarity educator I don’t provide advice on strategies and tactics. Instead I try to make space for activists to develop their own solutions to their problems, as they define them.

Conclusion

This work is messy and tricky. It is also time limited. Our long-term goal is to develop a self-sustaining network of Papuan activist educators. In other words, as an outsider I am looking at how this work might be handed over to Papuan activists. Ultimately as an Australian I need to engage more fully in how to change the way my own country supports the ongoing military, political and economic occupation of West Papua. I desire to do that in partnership with Papuan activists because transnational campaigns and movements are essential to affect change. This requires us to constantly reflect on and renegotiate our relationship with Papuan colleagues and the broader movement inside Papua. The principles of self-determination, nonviolent action, non-interference, non-partisanship and responsibility help guide the work. There are regularly moments of tension and conflict. However, the rewards are rich. If freedom is one of human beings higher aspirations, accompanying someone in the search for freedom and challenging the way colonialism damages us all, is to enter into relationships of deep meaning and feeling. On a good day it is to touch transformation. And that is a real privilege.

Alex Rayfield
Building Locally Driven Movements
A case of Turning the Tide in Kenya

When violence erupted after Kenya’s last elections in 2007, Kenyan Quakers were quick to react – first with humanitarian aid, then moving house-to-house listening to people’s experiences and worries. Eventually they began to help people process their trauma and knit their communities back together. But as they did this, people told them, “You are here telling us not to be violent. But if we hadn’t been violent you wouldn’t be here to begin with.” Some who heard that message promised to come back with a strategy to speak out strongly and loudly against social injustice but without resorting to violent methods.

Kenya was pulled back from the brink of civil war in 2007/2008 by a superficial peace agreement that did not guarantee that the structural root causes of the election violence would be addressed. The root causes are complex, but they all point to inadequate and self-interested governance that is propped up by endemic corruption and impunity. There are such riches to be personally gained by the victors, that political aspirants are motivated by greed to do everything in their power to win. This includes manipulating ethnic politics and leading the electorate to believe that if someone from their own group is in power those riches will trickle down to them. Thus, in Kenya, politics has been not so much about ideology as it has been about ethnic affiliation, loyalty, bribery, poverty, inequality and intimidation.

From a desire to challenge this broken system came an invitation in 2009 to Quaker Peace & Social Witness (QPSW), an arm of Quakers in Britain, to collaborate with Kenyan organisation, Change Agents for Peace International (CAPI). Plans were made to draw from and adapt the Turning the Tide model, a holistic QPSW approach to active nonviolence. The hope was to work toward building the momentum for a mass nonviolent witness for peaceful, transparent, free and fair elections. The vision of this joint work was to transform the angry, active and destructive energy that is so easily manipulated by political elites into a positive, nonviolent force to fight for people’s rights and to stand up for a just peace in Kenya. QPSW and CAPI believed that if people had nonviolent strategies for challenging injustice (i.e. structural violence) they would be less likely to resort to direct violence, and more likely to change the structural conditions that lead to that violence in the first place.

Several strategies have been central in the early years of this effort. The work, first and foremost, has been built on authentic partnership which springs from the Quaker understanding of equality. The idea that none of us is better or worse than anyone else extends in this context to the relationship between an outsider organisation (QPSW) and a local organisation (CAPI). This means that we are clear in our partnership that we are accomplishing something that we would not be able to do separately. We are greater than the sum of our parts, and we each bring essential expertise and resources to the table that are equally valued.

Secondly, we learned that we needed responsive flexible and context-appropriate training. While we began with the Turning the Tide methodology as it has been used in Britain and South Asia, we discovered – sometimes the hard way – that some of the examples and methodologies did not resonate in Kenya, while some new things were needed. The strength of Turning the Tide is in its enormous range of possibilities – it is not an off-the-shelf programme – and that core characteristic ultimately helped the training to be adapted, effective and locally owned. While the training is important, it is ongoing accomplishment that is essential to ensuring that the training takes root.

Nurturing community ownership is another key component of our approach. In Kenya, and indeed in many parts of Africa, it is common practice for international organisations to pay people a generous “sitting allowance” to attend workshops, and it is equally common for politicians to bribe people to attend their political rallies and buy their votes. Determined not to replicate this system, we never pay people to participate in this movement, in spite of strong pressure to do so. In this way, people who are not deeply committed drop away, and we are left with a strong and determined core. Now, communities are fundraising themselves for campaigns and to host workshops, and we never have trouble filling a room.

One reason for this is that each campaign is locally driven. This means that the resource people we recruit need to be influential active community mobilisers. We have found that who we invite to work alongside us is as important as the content of any training we deliver. Participants need to be people who have credibility in their communities and are inclined to analyse the social injustices hiding beneath commonly cited social problems such as unemployment, crime and lack of good infrastructure. Activists in this field need to be able to go where the energy is and start small. The approach helps people to move from the big issues (corruption, for example) to a discrete concrete problem around which a campaign can be organized. This work has had a surprising level of success. In just two years, students successfully exposed corrupt bursary disbursement practices at a University, motorcycle taxi drivers put a stop to fraudulent registration scams, community members mobilised against the construction of a dam that would displace 50,000, local farmers mobilised successfully against a bank that had changed the terms of their loans...and the examples go on.

Building on these small local successes, we believe that nonviolence is contagious. Each small success shows people the power of active nonviolence - and it is starting to spread. Building on the credibility that has come from these local campaigns, we were able to mobilise over 25,000 people in a mass civic education and watchdog campaign in preparation for the Kenyan elections on 4 March.

Will this work stop the violence this time round? Probably not entirely. But this movement is intended to affect long term cultural and structural change, and it is growing. So far it is showing every hopeful sign of being in it for the long haul.

Laura Shipler Chico
Save Jeju Island Campaign through the Movement Action Plan model

We, the members of World without War, held a Movement Building Workshop in March of last year in collaboration with Andreas Speck from War Resistors’ International. The workshop used the Movement Action Plan (MAP) model to examine our campaigning, particularly in relation to government’s abandonment of the previous administration’s plan to address the issue of alternative service. Our campaign has been at a standstill since the inauguration of the current government.

MAP was developed by US activist Bill Moyer to explore the stages and roles in successful nonviolent social movements. He described the eight stages as: 1) A critical social problem exists; 2) Proven failure of official institutions; 3) Ripening conditions; 4) Take off; 5) Perceived failure; 6) Majority public opinion; 7) Success; 8) Continuation. In these stages, there are four different advocate roles: Citizen, Rebel, Reformer and Social Change Agent. Social movements are complex and do not always follow the exact route that MAP articulates, but I found this tool to be very useful for us when World without War members felt tired, and often said we did not know what else to do.

We have never used a MAP analysis to examine the Save Jeju Island Campaign, so this article is my personal view of how the Save Jeju Island campaign relates to MAP.

Where are we now with MAP?

The South Korean government has been planning the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island since 1993. They said that “Imports and exports of Korea pass through the sea south of Jeju Island, so we have to defend it effectively and secure the transportation route for resources.” In 2002, the Korean government announced the new naval base construction plan in Hwasoon village, Jeju Island, but postponed it due to fierce opposition from Hwasoon villagers. This plan was relaunched in 2005, but it was again opposed by the people of Hwasoon. That summer, Wimi village on Jeju Island was named as the new site of construction, replacing Hwasoon.

This time, the budget proposal - which was based upon a premise that construction would only commence if the residents agreed - was passed in the National Assembly. Hwasoon and Wimi local residents held a general assembly and made an official decision to oppose the naval base.

In spring 2007, the Gangejong Village Association submitted an application to requesting the construction of the naval base in Gangejong. This decision was primarily a result of manipulation by the Jeju governor, who took every measure to win local people over in favour of construction. It was not the majority opinion. In fact, the Gangejong Village Association general assembly where 94% against the naval base plan. This represents stage 1 of the MAP: The Korean government preached the need for the naval base on Jeju Island for national security, but local people did not agree.

The second stage lasted from 2007 - when Gangejong people started agitating against the naval base plan – to 2009, when civic groups launched a campaign to recall Jeju Island’s governor, and held a referendum to this affect. In this campaign, the government and Navy tried to conceal the root of the issue: that plans to construct a national military facility were approved in early 2009, and that the Jeju Island provincial government made a civil-military dual port construction work contract with the Navy and the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. Many Jeju Island civic groups took action themselves to prove that these institutions were not our friend, and in May 2009, they launched the campaign to recall the governor. In the end, the results of the recall vote fell short of expectations.

The third stage, ‘ripening conditions’, lasted until the end of 2011. At this time, the local movement entered a period of slight recession as a result of the unsuccessful campaign to recall the governor. Simultaneously, activists from the mainland moved to Jeju Island to join the campaign, and started to convince civic groups on the mainland that the campaign against the naval base had not ended. Their efforts set off nationwide demonstrations against the construction of the naval base, and the Nationwide Committee to Stop the Jeju Naval Base was launched in May 2011. The committee mobilized many people from all over the mainland to come to Gangejong in 2011. There was growing recognition of the problems as these supporters met and talked with Gangejong villagers personally, and saw the striking scenery of Gangejong with their own eyes. The whole village was deluged with the colorful banners that brought by visitors during this period. Also, in December 2011, the National Assembly cut 96% of the Jeju naval base budget for 2012: the movement at this time was ripe and active.

2012 was the fourth stage of the MAP. The Korean government blasted the Gureombi Rock (both an important environmental resource and an ancient place of prayer) and started construction. A great number of people - Koreans and internationals - came to Gangejong village and took various direct actions to halt construction. Others supported the campaign in significant and powerful ways. The campaign was at its peak.
The fifth stage started at the end of 2012, when the conservative party won the presidential election, and the National Assembly passed the naval base budget proposal for 2013. The activists of the Save Jeju Campaign are in an uphill battle with heavy fines totaling 300 million won (approximately 210,000 Euros) and confinements when their trials start. They felt frustration, despair, and exhaustion. Participation in movement events decreased as the response of governmental power toward the actions strengthened and media coverage died down.

The Save Jeju Campaign is still in stage 5. The beautiful landscape of the seashore of Gangjeong seems to change day by day as the construction proceeds, and this has led to a feeling of helplessness. However, we won’t stop our efforts to make Jeju Island a peaceful island. There is a possibility that other military installations - including an Air Force base, Missile base and Marine Corps base - are to be built on Jeju Island; the government’s plans do not end with a naval base. This will likely be an issue during the 2014 local elections, and we plan to build a network with civic groups in Okinawa and Hawaii, who are facing similar problems in trying to demilitarize their Islands.

Roles of different groups

In each stage, activists have done a zillion things. The role of World without War in the campaign was mainly the ‘Rebel’, especially in its fourth stage. We carried out direct actions which helped promote the issue in the media and raise awareness across the nation. World without War joined the Nationwide Committee to Stop the Jeju Naval Base and performed the role of the ‘Change Agent’ of the MAP. We are doing our utmost to train and mobilize people. There are 3 main agents in the campaign: Nationwide Committee to Stop the Jeju Naval Base, Jeju Pan-Island Committee for Prevention of Military Base and for Realization of Peace Island, and Gangjeong Village Association. They are the reformers and the ‘Change Agent’ of the MAP and aim to promote long-term strategies together.

The new president of Korea has always been very pro-naval base. She has ambitions to turn Jeju Island into a “second Hawaii,” and will push ahead with the plan. The new government would argue that the plan is now irreversible and opposition has been defeated. Our task is to reveal the power holder’s tricks – civil-military dual port, planned new (military) airport, etc., and promote alternative solutions.

Jungmin Choi

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**International day of action**

**For Military-Free Education and Research**

As part of WRI’s Countering the Militarisation of Youth work we are keen to help coordinate an international day of action For Military-Free Education and Research, which will take place on 14 June 2013. The day will be based on the September 2012 week of action in Germany, which was supported by over one hundred groups and organisations, with actions in at least eight cities.

Many of the actions during the September 2012 week involved handing out leaflets at schools and other education centres, highlighting the dangers of joining the military, and the leaflets were accompanied in some cases with fake blood, a coffin, and chocolate ‘medicine’ to protect students against military propaganda.

Read a full summary of the week at http://wri-irg.org/node/21068.

The German activists saw the week as ‘an experiment in nationwide networking and cooperation’, and are planning to do a similar week in 2014, possibly in June – they hope that groups in other countries will join them. The day of action this year will help to introduce groups to the campaign, and test out action ideas before the much bigger week in 2014.

A successful international day of action would involve events in different countries which are all on the same theme (Military-Free Education and Research), and which use the same slogans and logo(s), but individual groups will have autonomy in organising their actions.

Please email owen@wri-irg.org if your group would be interested in taking part in the June day of action, and/or the 2014 week of action, or if you would like to learn more (this doesn’t commit you to taking part!). The WRI office will support any member groups or individuals who want to take action.
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Published by: War Resisters’ International
Edited by Ellen Elster and Majken Jul Sørensen
Preface by Cynthia Enloe

Social change doesn’t just happen. It’s the result of the work of committed people striving for a world of justice and peace. This work gestates in groups or cells of activists, in discussions, in training sessions, in reflecting on previous experiences, in planning, in experimenting and in learning from others. Preparing ourselves for our work for social justice is key to its success. There is no definitive recipe for successful nonviolent actions and campaigns. This handbook, however, is a series of resources that can inspire and support your own work, especially if you adapt the resources to your own needs and context.

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The Broken Rifle

The Broken Rifle is the newsletter of WRI, and is published in English, Spanish, and German. This is issue 95, March 2013.

This issue of The Broken Rifle was produced by Hannah Brock and Javier Gárate. Thanks to our contributors Rasmus Grobe, Majken Jul Sørensen, Boro Kitanoski, Igor Seke, Alex Rayfield, Laura Shipler Chico, and Jungmin Choi. If you want extra copies of this issue of The Broken Rifle, please contact the WRI office, or download it from our website.

War Resisters’ International, 5 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DX, Britain tel +44-20-7278 4500 fax +44-20-7278 0444 info@wri-irg.org http://wri-irg.org/pubs/br95-en.htm

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