State militarism: militarisation beyond the armed forces

In the office, daily media alerts send us news of conscientious objectors, child soldiers, peace activists and nonviolent direct action around the world. One day, it was the news that in Birmingham - England's second largest city – soldiers from the 'Royal Military Police' (aka the 'red caps') were 'keeping clubbers safe' in the city centre. That is, arresting soldiers on nights out, or giving 'citizens arrests' to civilians who they thought were breaking the law.

The article, from West Midlands police, finishes "They add to the diversity of the area and people love to see our troops. Just like the song 'All nice girls love a sailor' well in this case all nice girls love a Red Cap!" We wondered whether a direct action arresting those 'Red caps' who arrest citizens might be a fun evening out...

Perhaps inevitably, many of the articles in this edition are about police militarisation. Whether in South Africa (article by Laura Polleccut), Britain (article by Betsy Barkas), Turkey (written by WRI's new staff member Semih Sapmaz) or the USA (piece from War Resisters League's Ali Issa and Tara Tabassi), police forces are a form of social control. They lend themselves to being dragged along the spectrum of violence and militarisation towards more visible and immediate brutality, usually on the basis of how threatened those with power feel their privilege to be. The point of police forces is coercion (whether through direct violence, restraint, or the threat of punishment): to keep the people in line, for better or worse.

Other articles in this edition of The Broken Rifle show militarisation infiltrating state functions far beyond the armed forces or the police: we have Cesar Padilla on the militarisation of extractive industries in Latin America, Prasanna Ratnayake on militarisation in Sri Lanka over the last ten years, and Maren Mantovani (of Stop the Wall) and Henrique Sanchez (of MOPAT - Movimento Palestina para Tod@s) on the 'security' services provided by Israeli companies across the world. Frances Guy shares experiences of working in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, focusing on the relationship between delivery of humanitarian assistance after (often militarily-created) crises, and 'security' and 'defence'.

You cannot keep the lid on the logic that militarism rests on - the control by violence, hierarchical uniformity, the racism, patriarchy and nationalism that makes it all possible, as well as – of course – reliance on weapons. It spills into the education system, architecture and public spaces, culture and entertainment, health care (in short, into everything) as this collection of articles demonstrates. And of course, 'keeping the lid' on militarism is not at all the point anyway. The lie that the existence of armed forces both keeps the rest of us safe, and prevents us from having to take up arms ourselves (essentially limiting militarism, confining it to a small 'band of brothers' so the rest of us can go about our non-militarised business), is both pervasive and ridiculous.

On social media we try and highlight these instances of militarism all around us using #EverydayMilitarism. Seeing something everyday, it's hard either to notice or reject it. Like a fish in water, you do not feel the weight. In our work on youth militarisation, we are logging the ways that young people get exposed to that militarism so early, and the things we are doing to resist this. Look at our website here to read more.

Hannah Brock
Our police are militarised and that needs to be addressed

Laura Pollecutt

During the years of apartheid, discussions were ongoing both inside and outside the country, about how state security institutions would function in a post-apartheid democratic state. These discussions intensified in the dying years of apartheid.

There was little difference between the army and the police under apartheid; both were used to keep the minority government in power by repressive means. In fact these two institutions were often in competition to see who could serve their National Party masters best. The police had far-reaching powers and were heavily armed to quell ‘unrest’. After 1994 it was important to ensure that the police were trained and could carry out their duties in a way that would be a service to citizens. Consequently, the name changed from South African Police (force) to South African Police Service to emphasize the needed change in attitude. New police ranking structures were also introduced to demilitarise the police.

Levels of crime in South Africa are high. Consequently, post-apartheid police cabinet ministers and commissioners have panicked to call for more of what the apartheid government would have called ‘Kragdagheid’ (forcefulness, an iron fist) in dealing with crime. The language was, and still is, ‘war talk’. The police hierarchy advocates greater aggression in the pursuit and arrest of criminals and talks constantly of the ‘war against crime’. Despite it being against the law, police officers are encouraged ‘to shoot to kill’. Those who believe the police should be both judge and executioner like to claim that criminals have more rights than ordinary citizens.

Demilitarists have opposed the remilitarization of the police services regularly advocated by politicians and spoke out particularly when it became known that moves were afoot to reintroduce military rankings. Despite this opposition, military rankings were reintroduced in 2010 to what they were under apartheid. The change was not popular even within the police services. In 2011 police union Popcru tried to have the reintroduction of military rankings declared unlawful reminding South Africans: “It was precisely in order to break with the ‘soldiers at war’ mindset and to build a police service that was democratic and accountable that demilitarization of the police was such a crucial part of ANC policy.” POPCRUD did not succeed.

But it probably in public order policing that militarization has really thrived. In the early 1990s, after the unbanning of the liberation movements, talks were ongoing between these movements and the apartheid government. At this time the country was plagued by internal political violence and an ‘internal stability division’ was established. In line with addressing negative perceptions of apartheid security forces, the unit was renamed Public Order Policing post the elections in 1994. Progressive models of policing were adopted and public order policing was made more user-friendly. As Tait and Marks record in You strike a gathering you strike a rock, SA Crime Quarterly No 38, December 2011: “Public order policing training focused on a shift from the ‘control of crowds’ to the management of crowds’. Public order unit members were required to think about ways of policing crowds that resulted in minimal use of force, to negotiate with convenors and authorisers about policing plans and outcomes, to employ policing tactics that demonstrated tolerance, and to make use of weapons that fitted the new framework for crowd control.”

I think it is safe to say that this model was guided by what had been envisaged in the Regulation of Gatherings Act passed just prior to the new dispensation. A flawed piece of legislation in many ways, it did, however, move away from the repressive policing of gatherings by the apartheid government.

The enlightened approach, however, was disrupted by restructuring over the years and there was an emergence of (or possibly a return to?) a more paramilitary approach to public order policing. Initially these units were known as Tactical Response Unit (TRUs) but later reverted to being called Public Order Policing. Frustration and disappointment with the pace of delivery has led to frequent service delivery protests often accompanied by destruction of property and confrontations with the police. Studies have shown that these protests only really get out of hand when communities believe they are not being heard by their government representatives. Since 2004 at least 44 people have been killed by the police in protests. This figure includes the massacre at Marikana where 34 people were killed and 78 wounded. South Africa is awaiting the outcome of the commission of inquiry into this horrendous incident.

Because of training offered by the French police, SAPS has tended towards their model of public order policing. Offering caution regarding acceptance of this model, Tait and Marks argue that though the French Gendarmerie tactics are effective, they are also criticised because they are perceived as paramilitary and rely on shows of force. Unfortunately, the show of force is becoming a regular feature in public order policing.

Opinions regarding the role of local police and that of the TRUs/public order policing, in public order policing, differ. Some suggest that the local police, who because they are not trained sufficiently, resort more frequently to violence when quelling demonstrators than the public order policing unit does. Others believe the local police have more empathy with demonstrators than a public order policing unit from outside and therefore are more able to stabilize the situation. From my own observations, it would appear to me that the paramilitary character of the public order policing unit with its sophisticated weaponry, armoured vehicles (Nyalas were used now and were used extensively by apartheid police and the association does not escape the communities) and equipment, heightens tensions in crowd control particularly in communities where protest action is more spontaneous and the Regulation of Gatherings Act has not been used. Although local police work with the public order policing unit, it sometimes appears to be an uneasy relationship.

The Markana bloodbath saw both local police and the public order policing unit involved. At the time, the Ceasefire Campaign expressed concern that previously and during the actual incident, police had lacked restraint in crowd control situations. Ceasefire was also unhappy about the extensive firepower that was on display (the symbolic demonstration of power that is a part of a paramilitary force) before the police opened fire possibly under the mistaken belief that it would disperse the crowd.

History has taught us that weaponry tends to aggravate a tense situation not subdue it. There has been a call for restraining of the Public Order Policing Unit and a return to the model that was used in the early years of our democracy. Jan Burger of the Institute for Security Studies has called attention to sections of South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, titled ‘Our future - make it work’. It contains a number of far-reaching recommendations, which, he believes, if implemented, could see dramatic improvements not only in policing but throughout government. “The NDP strongly recommends that the SAPS be demilitarised and that this should happen as soon as possible. It also recommends that the organisational culture of the police should be reviewed to assess the effects of militarisation, demilitarisation, and remilitarisation and ‘the serial crises of top management’.”

However, Burger suggests that there is not sufficient content in the

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recommendations as to its understanding of militarisation and demilitarisation and supports the view that the police cannot be demilitarised by merely reverting back to previous non-military style rankings. He refers to an ISS seminar on 11 April 2013 titled ‘Understanding police brutality in South Africa: challenges and solutions’, where he says it was argued "that the police are not militarised or demilitarised simply by changing their ranks. Rather it is the language and tone of their political and senior leaders that contribute to the creation of a form of militarisation". Regrettably there appears to be a gap in what the NDP recommends and how those involved in policing see a reversal of the paramilitary style of public order policing. At a parliamentary briefing in Sept 2014, there was no reference to the NDP and very little concern for citizens’ right to demonstrate unharmed. The presentation argues for an increase in resources in line with the paramilitary nature of the unit. It would seem that steps are being taken to impose the state’s authority, through public order policing, on dissent in the lead up to municipal elections next year.

In a Right to Know (R2K) campaign statement issued on human rights day 21 March, the campaign demands that the people’s right to protest, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, be respected and protected by the police. It concludes:

The police must change!

The growing criminalization of protests is an attack on freedom of expression and assembly. The right to protest was at the heart of the democratic struggle for freedom. Mobilising brute force against unarmed individuals is an insult not just to the freedoms of expression and assembly enshrined in our Constitution; it is a rejection of the legacy of the struggle for which thousands paid the ultimate price.

Is UK policing becoming more like the military?

Betsy Barkas

The recent wave of opposition to police violence in the US under the banner of #BlackLivesMatter has alerted the world to the disturbing use of lethal force by several US police forces against Black communities. Yet looking closely at some trends in UK policing indicate the British public should not be complacent about its own situation.

The concept of “policing by consent” has long held a special place in the public discourse around policing in the UK. Devised by the first Metropolitan Police Commissioners (the head of London’s police force) in the early 19th century, the key prescriptions of “policing by consent” are the minimum use of force, the recognition that police power is derived from the public’s approval, and the idea that the police rely on “willing cooperation”.

But are these principles anything more than a nice idea? At least in part, they were invented to win over a public who were suspicious and alarmed at the government’s efforts to establish the Metropolitan police in the first place. A commonly held view at the time was that police forces should be under local control, rather than the control of the national government. This is one of the reasons that to this day, the UK doesn’t have a national police force unlike many other countries.

But the UK’s Black and migrant communities have always suffered disproportionately heavy policing, so “policing by consent” has never been universal, if it ever existed at all. In fact, there is a long and shameful history of the use of lethal force by the UK’s police officers – and a lack of basic accountability for the families of the victims. Recent developments in the normalisation of the use of weaponry and a blurring of the boundary between the military and policing all provide further cause for concern.

Weapony

The controversial purchase of three water cannon in 2014 raised public concern that the ideal of an unarmed police force was under threat. The potential use of this type of weaponry, coupled with the rolling back of freedoms to protest and assemble, raise serious questions about the capacity of British citizens to exercise their democratic freedoms. Earlier this month the Home Secretary appeared to waver on the issue, when she announced that the use of the water cannon would not be approved until after the UK’s general election in May. Perhaps even more worrying is the routine use of Tasers (electroshock weapons manufactured by a company called Taser International). First introduced for use by specialist officers, Tasers are now deployed to ordinary rank-and-file officers. Although billed as “less-lethal”, Amnesty reports that in the US, over 500 deaths have occurred after shocks with Tasers either during arrest or while in jail since 2001. In the UK, individual cases of Taser use have sharply increased in recent years and now number thousands every year. Figures emerged recently showing that Tasers were used disproportionately on Black communities in London, and that children as young as 11 were being subjected to Tasers. The Home Secretary has called for a review of their use.

The long arm of the law

Yet these recent public debates over new weaponry should not distract us from the troubling long history of force, sometimes lethal, used by UK police forces. UK firearms policy is rare among police forces globally, in that officers are not "routinely" armed. However, firearms units do exist to support individual forces. Part of their role is to respond reactively to incidents involving weapons. But firearms units are also used “pro-actively” within drug, firearms or counterterrorism policing operations. These “pro-active” operations draw heavily from the military handbook, using dawn raids, and relying on intelligence gathering procedures that are prevalent from public scrutiny. They are kept secret in ensuing court processes. Another particularly contentious tactic used by firearms units is the ‘hard stop’: armed, plain clothes officers in police vehicles intercept another vehicle to confront suspects using extreme physical aggression designed to ‘shock and awe’ subjects into submission.

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State militarisation

... continued from page 3. The tragic deaths of Azelle Rodney in 2005 and Mark Duggan in 2011 at the hands of firearms officers following two of these pre-planned ‘hard stop’ operations demonstrated a number of similarities. Through the inquest and Inquiry processes, it has been established that there was insufficient planning, limited intelligence, and someone shot dead who did not pose an immediate threat and was not holding any weapon. Other deaths by police shooting that didn’t involve a hard stop, such as Anthony Grainger in 2012, Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 and Harry Stanley in 1999 also demonstrate the tragic consequences of combining lethal force with stereotype, conjecture, and limited intelligence.

The police marksmen who shot Azelle Rodney eight times in the head and body near facing a murder charge. However, the tragedies that result from the use of lethal police force do not, in general, attract criminal prosecutions even on the rare occasions that inquests return a verdict of “unlawful killing”. In fact, there has not been a successful homicide prosecution of a police officer for any death in custody for 30 years. Vital legal routes to challenge these policing tactics remain largely out of reach for the families and for the public at large.

Counterterrorism: the battlefield comes home

It is especially clear how blurred policing and the military have become in the realm of counterterrorism. Controversy over the way in which these operations were being directed first came to the fore after the death of Brazilian electrician Jean Charles de Menezes, shot dead on his way to work on a tube carriage by officers carrying out a botched counterterrorism operation in the wake of the London 7/7 bombings in 2005. It later emerged that there had been a series of failings in communication and strategy within the policing operation. At least part of the confusion stemmed from the “Kratos” policy—a set of counterterrorism protocols that had been developed after 9/11 after consultation with a range of national police forces including that of Israel and Sri Lanka.

What shocked many people in the aftermath was that the Kratos policy recommended multiple shots to the head: de Menezes was shot in the head seven times. What was less remarked upon was that the usual legal justification for the use of force was undermined by the new protocol. Conventional non-Kratos firearms guidance dictates that officers must only fire when there is an immediate threat, and that this legal test applies to each individual shot. In its place, Kratos substituted a command structure based on an assumption that a commanding officer would have access to intelligence that officers on the ground would not—raising the possibility that effectively, officers could be given orders to shoot to kill, although officials have never admitted that Kratos amounted to this.

More recently, counterterrorism initiatives have invited the involvement of the military itself in policing. Following the Charlie Hebdo and killings in the Jewish supermarket in Paris, Special Air Service (SAS, part of the British Army) units, after being deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, were deployed to the streets of the UK to work with police in the biggest domestic military deployment since the London 2012 Olympics. The SAS is reportedly also working alongside “Humint” units—covert intelligence gatherers used in Afghanistan and Iraq, now deployed in UK cities. It’s difficult to see how these operations can be held to account at all; there is barely any information in the public domain about these covert units or the SAS.

An urgent debate

The spectacle of Special Forces on the streets of Paris in the wake of the January killings is something that in another time would have been considered shocking—it was barely remarked upon by commentators. Does this reflect a tacit acceptance of the blurring between the military and the police? An atmosphere of generalised fear appears to be bolstering the position of those who argue that a more militarised police force is the only way to keep the public safe: in January, the threat of similar attacks in the UK was used as a justification to maintain 25 firearms officers in Manchester, which were due to be retired.

But it is on exactly these occasions, when the state comes to view its own citizens as the “enemy within” that questioning the use of force within policing is even more vital. Taken together, these trends towards the militarisation of policing necessitate a much wider and urgent debate.

Mining, militarisation and criminalisation of social protest in Latin America

Cesar Padilla, Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, OCMAL

Translated from Spanish by Grace Brown

It is not news to say that extractivism in Latin America has been imposing an increasingly deeper model of extraction and export. The competition to be a destination of mining, oil-reserves, forestry or fishing investment is a characteristic of the majority of the countries in the region. However, extractivism is receiving increasing criticism from broad sections of society including academia and social movements.

One of the most important criticisms says that extractivism not only fails to relieve poverty and dependency, but it actually perpetuates these conditions. This has come to be known as “the curse of abundance”.

This curse has nothing to do with “living seated on a bag full of gold” and remaining poor. That which reigns in the economic programs of the Latin American Governments is to move from an economy of extractivism, to achieve more growth or to pay social debts by means of various types of bonuses. This bonusesocracy (a term used to describe countries which grant bonuses to the most vulnerable sections of society) has become a way of perpetually sustaining progressive sectors in governments. By capturing the majority vote in this way, they have said goodbye to using ideological support in order to gain executive power.

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This curse of abundance has transformed into the curse of extractivism. The imposition of mining projects for example, has resulted in an increasing conflicts with local communities. So much so that today in Latin America no new mining projects have been developed without socio-environmental conflicts and community resistance.

It is said that the mining sector faces three principle conditions: The difficulty in finding new reservoirs, the increase in the costs of production and the growing lack of social licence and increasing community rejection.

The first two conditions have technical solutions. The third has been addressed with different approaches, all of which have been unsuccessful to date. The initial attempt was Social Corporate Responsibility (SCR) through the creation of military and the police? An atmosphere of generalised fear appears to be bolstering the position of those who argue that a more militarised police force is the only way to keep the public safe: in January, the threat of similar attacks in the UK was used as a justification to maintain 25 firearms officers in Manchester, which were due to be retired.

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option, corruption, division and social decomposition. The failure of these strategies finally brought business and governments to impose projects in the face of social opposition through the criminalisation of protest.

The allegations of the anti-mining leadership are in the news constantly, with or without foundation, as was the case of Javier Ramírez, anti-mining leader of the Intag community, in the north of Quito in Ecuador. After he was captured unjustly, the community became militarised, using weapons to instil fear. Even though it is certain, as in many cases, that neutralising the community’s rejection to mining will not be achieved, they achieve self-censorship and fear of openly expressing one’s opinions on the development.

But militarisation is not only part of the politics of progressive governments but also countries that have transformed themselves into mining models as in the case of Chile. Here, a police contingent has virtually held the Caimán community kidnapped, in the east of the port of Los Vilos. It had mobilised and taken the access roads to the Pelambres de Antofagasta Minerals mining installations, for nothing but to demand a judicial decision that determined the restitution of the waters intervened by the mining for the construction and operation of a tailings dam. In the last period of conflict, the town of Caimanés had remained mobilized for more than three months demanding that the highest court be granted to them and that the business refuses to give compensation.

The police force has militarised the zone, dispatching Special Forces to prevent the community, through social pressure, from obtaining their consecrated right for the judicial decision of last resort.

Sadly famous is also the case of Maxima Acuna in the locality of Celendín, Cajamarca, Peru. Here, the Yanacocha mine, known worldwide for its trampling of human rights and the use of force with its group of private guards “Forza”, has managed to circumvent judicial decisions that have been granted in repeated opportunities to the family of Maxima in respect of the ownership of their lands.

Despite the fact that Yanacocha recognised this family’s rights over reclaimed land, in order to develop its Conga Project, the harassment and atrocities continue as if the voice of justice was carried away by the wind. Maxima was criminalised by the prosecutors, a request of Yanacocha (property of the Newmont Mining Corporation business, the Peruvian national group Cia. National Buenaventura and International Finance Corporation IFC), and condemned in the first instance to prison and payment of an indemnity to the mine. Then at appeal he was absolved of all charges, recognising the rights over his lands. Apparently in Peru, this is not sufficient, and it has become a tendency that criminalisation is one of the last resorts utilised once other strategies of dissuasion and convincing have failed.

In the cases mentioned and many others, criminalisation through judicialisation has been a well-used practice in countries like Peru and Ecuador. In Peru, the majority of the cases of criminalisation are dropped at the higher level, which denotes a complexity between governments, business and some local judges, in cases that don’t stand up legally.

In Ecuador on the contrary, the political dependency and the fear instilled in justice on the part of the central government has managed to incarcerate leaders unjustly and zones are militarised in order to impose extraction projects. The lack of dependency on justice in Ecuador has achieved a high level of self-censorship and the increase of the risks of opposing extractivism generates a great deal of uncertainty and fear in the population.

In Bolivia, for its part, there have also existed episodes of criminalisation. Especially in the case of Canicio Rojas, leader of the Mallku Qota community that opposes a mining Project in Potosí, who was unjustly incarcerated. But perhaps the most serious has been the strategy of division by force of one of the icons of the indigenous movement of the Bolivian Altiplano. We are referring to the Conamaq. Through the medium of violence, and the use of the armed police force, the government decided to collapse the organisation, permitting the assault at its headquarters and the aggression toward its leaders.

The motive of these arbitrary and antidemocratic measures was the non-acceptance of the extractivist model of the government of Morales since the communities affected reclaimed the loss of rights against the mining projects. The fact that a president of indigenous origin uses state violence in order to suppress the indigenous movement and its demands, attracts attention.

We are not talking about countries where legacies of dictatorial regimes are those that criminalise and suppress the population with the use of the armed police force as has been the case in Guatemala and Honduras. We speak of alternative governments, brought to the control of the executive with the unconditional support of social and indigenous movements, and where without them they would not have had the opportunity to govern.

It shows us that extractivism has installed itself in Latin America as an act of faith in Latin American leadership. And as in other eras, it imposes blood and fire, costing sometimes life, freedom and the democracy of our villages. Nonetheless, this has not diminished the resistance that manifests itself increasingly greatly in the defence and the recuperation of essential rights for the support of political projects of justice and equality in the region.
Resisting Police Militarisation

Ali Issa & Tara Tabassi

As national organizers of War Resisters League, and as people committing our lives to challenging militarism globally, we do not often experience moments when our work comes together, where people power is stronger than people in power. But much came together on September 5th, 2014, and we could feel that people power strength. A cross-community rally outside the Oakland Marriott Hotel in Oakland, California - the host of cop-shop weapons expo Urban Shield - was the culmination of months of local and national organizing across the United States. Towards the end of the day we were excited to hear the announcement: Oakland Mayor Jean Quan promised that Urban Shield would end its 8-year run and not be hosted there next year. As organizers celebrated this development, we also understood this was just the beginning - not only of our work against Urban Shield, but in forging synergy between movements against war, militarism, police violence and for the self-determination of all communities worldwide. As the Stop Urban Shield coalition said in our statement the next day:

Organizers have asserted, however, that their work is far from over. While Oakland will not host the trade show and training, they have not received guarantees that the city will completely withdraw participation, i.e. providing city funding, sending city agencies and offering city sites for future Urban Shields. In the words of Lara Krawitt of the Arab Resource and Organizing Center, “We say no to Urban Shield anywhere; we say no to militarization everywhere.”

Urban Shield has been held in 3 locations, Boston, Massachusetts, and Central Texas, in addition to Oakland, California. Further underlining this expansion is the clear growth of the national grant program which provides Urban Shield with its fund: the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). The Department of Homeland Security program offers over 500 million in grants to ‘high risk’ urban areas in the U.S., and grew by nearly 30 million last year alone. UASI provides equipment such as drones and armored personnel carriers, but above all it trains police departments and emergency response teams in the tactics of counter-terrorism. That is to say: Urban Shield, the clearest and most spectacular example of expost that drive militarism deeper into our communities, runs programs running in dozens of cities across the U.S. (39 last year) as quieter and more pervasive cousins. Further, Urban Shield’s reach is felt globally, with platinum vendors featured such as Safariland. This key weapons manufacturer exports tear gas and other repressive technologies to Brazil, Bahrain and Canada, just to name a few. Concurrently, police departments from Israel, Greece, and the United Arab Emirates compete in the trainings gaining and implementing militarized strategies. Not an anomaly, these types of gatherings often proudly claim that the next will be “more international than ever.”

That is exactly why our efforts to Stop Urban Shield have expanded as well, to focus on its central financial backer—the Urban Areas Security Initiative. It is our contention that more cross-community coalitions have enough power and more to remove this force from their communities, and instead use those resources for community-determined emergency response that does not amplify the power of police and military. This has born fruit in the area that receives the highest amount of UASI funds - New York City - at 178 million in 2014 alone. WRL’s initiative to “Defund [Commissioner] Bratton’s Army” has received enthusiastic response across the city, as Bratton announced a new counter-terrorism unit, called “the strategic response group” units earlier this year. The New York Police Department is not only a domestic force. It operates in eleven countries outside the US, including Yemen, Germany, Afghanistan, and Israel to coordinate repression around the globe.

As WRL member Skanda Kadirgamar noted at a recent ‘Safety Beyond Policing’ press conference in New York City:

“Just as we need to reinvest the 1.3 trillion the U.S. spends on the military every year, New York City needs to put resources in building communities, not occupying them. That communities say NYPD ‘occupies’ their neighborhoods isn’t a metaphor. It’s the lived experience of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers. Bratton’s announcement of the DHS-funded Strategic Response Group earlier this year just underlines that fact. Machine guns and counterterrorism tactics isn’t what New York needs, it’s schools and health services. Invest in life!”

Urban Shield will only deepen the crisis of police violence and repression faced by our communities. Instead of building the NYPD’s power to criminalize, control, and kill people, we need resources that keep communities healthy, whole and free to flourish. We will not stop until we have them. Not stopping means knowing where we are going. Knowing what world it is we want, and living that in our practice of resistance. Knowing that we must transform the logic of repression and fear all around us into cultures of care, support and solidarity. Not stopping means pushing for something radical we might call, revolutionary nonviolence. See photo on page 1.

the Local World Cup Organizing Committee. The most dangerous step occurred days after this event when the General of the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Brazilian Presidency, signed a secret military cooperation agreement whose terms involve “details on accreditation of people, organizations and companies to deal with confidential matters, and on bilateral transit secret documents”. This deal spurred even more efforts by the Israeli government and military industry to gain more contracts intelligence and homeland security contracts in Brazil.

Between 2010 and 2013, the Israeli consultancy in Brazil organized various meetings with federal authorities and local governments to present methods and technology of repression and proposed partnerships in the ‘security’ area. The meetings consolidated institutional links and resulted in a number of training courses for civil and military police. Many lectures, workshops and conferences were organized by local and federal government agencies and entrepreneurs featured Israeli security experts (in most cases ex-soldiers turned entrepreneurs or security consultants) as main panelists. In some states, the military police had the assignment to bring police and Israeli security experts to teach courses.

The Israeli connection is surely not at the root of the endemic level of human rights abuses conducted by the Brazilian police, especially against poor and black people. However, when Amnesty International cited last week as one of the main causes of the rising police violence the ‘logic of confrontation with the enemy’ among the police, it becomes clear that Israeli influence has only worsened the situation.

For people in Brazil, the strengthening of military relations between Brazil and Israel is a serious threat because the military hi-tech from Israel is to be used primarily against black and poor youth and social movements and because the police trainings and military cooperation consolidate an authoritarian, punitive - and failed - public security model, which contributes to bring existing state violence to an even more dramatic level.

The international campaign of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel launched in 2005 by Palestinian civil society has received growing support from social movements and civil society and successfully pressured governments, public institutions and companies to stop their cooperation and complicity with Israeli apartheid. In Brazil, campaigns for a military embargo on Israel - which already lead to the cancelling of a government project to support the Israeli military company Elbit Systems in building an entire airspace trade and control park in the south of Brazil - also strengthen the struggle for the demilitarization of the police and for a radically democratic model of public security.

...continued from page 7.
The case of Brazil: Israel’s experience of repression of the Palestinian people goes global

By: Maren Mantovani (Stop the Wall) and Henrique Sanchez (MOCAT - Movimento Palestina para Tod@s)

In a globalized world, any analysis of militarized and repressive ideologies, methodologies and technologies has to take into account the dynamics of import and export of these concepts and tools across borders. One of the world’s most prominent exporters of ideology and technology of repression is undoubtedly Israel. With over sixty years of experience in repressing the Palestinian people and expelling them from their lands, Israel markets proudly its weapons for war and ‘riot control’ as ‘field tested’ - either during the repeated full-scale military aggressions against Palestinian territory or Arab countries or in the day-to-day subjugation of a people under occupation.

No surprise then that Israeli companies are among the key players in the biddings for the huge amounts of ‘security’ spending linked to so-called Mega Events, such as World Cups and Olympics. These events have turned one of the most effective means to open large markets for measures of control and repression as concerns about privacy, freedom of expression and other basic rights are set aside considering the ‘exceptionality’ of the events.

Unfortunately, once these repressive mechanisms are in place, they are there to stay.

Brazil’s hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games is exemplary in this sense: it has given Israeli military and security companies an enormous space for penetration into Brazil’s military, police and public institutions, with lasting negative impacts on the Palestinian as well as Brazilian people. This ‘security’ cooperation adds to the multi billion business between Brazil and the Israeli military that has been developing over the last decade and, in clear contradiction with its diplomatic rhetoric of support for Palestinian rights, has turned Brazil into the world’s fifth biggest importer of Israeli weapons.

This has created rising opposition within Brazil’s social movements and the National Network of Popular Committees of the World Cup, created to defend the people against human rights violations linked to the World Cup, not only denounced the negative impact of military cooperation with Israel on the Brazilian population but even considered the Palestinian people as one of the people directly affected by the 2014 Games in Brazil because of the enormous cash flow that the ‘security’ spending procured to sustain the Israeli military industry. The Olympic Games are repeating a similar scenario: the most exemplary case is the local Olympics Committee’s decision to contract the Israeli company International Security & Defence Systems (ISDS) to coordinate the entire security operation of the Games (with a total expenditure of 2.2 billion dollars), including the training of Brazilian police officers and the provision of equipment. Additionally, ISDS will receive advertising space worth 20 million. ISDS has already held various contracts for ‘security’, including Athens (2004), South Africa (2010) and the Panamerican Games (2007). However, this time civil society has launched a campaign to ‘Stop that Shameful Contract’.

ISDS’s founder and CEO Leo Gleiser has a long history of working with the Israeli military and intelligence. His company is built on this experience with the repression and massacre of the Palestinian people, which he has turned against the people across Latin America. According to existing documentation, since its foundation in 1982 the company has been involved with dictatorships and coups in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and the training of the “Contras” in Nicaragua. In Guatemala, it openly offered classes of “selective terror” at the time of the genocide. In Honduras, it trained the military personnel during the dictatorship in the 80’s and provided the weapons that were used in the attack on the Brazilian embassy where President Zelaya was finding refuge after his overthrow in 2009. The company is a key part of the system of Israeli military interventions, as explained by Israeli journalist Yossi Melman: “The Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry or the Mossad gets a request to provide security advice or to train army or security service forces for the ruler of a country, usually a tyrant. Because the authorities cannot, or do not want, to assist the ruler directly, although they view his request as important in order to promote security or political interests - they ask a private company to provide the service being requested.”

Unfortunately, this shameful contract is only the culmination of the penetration of the Israeli military and homeland security complex in Brazil.

In November 2009, a month after Brazil had been selected to host the World Cup and the Olympics, former Israeli President Shimon Peres lead a delegation of Israeli businessmen and assured Brazil that “in all that you want, we are ready to help in any way in our power”. Three months later, the Israeli government organized a seminar on public safety exclusively for the 8 Brazilian states authorities chosen to host the World Cup4. The workshop discussed Israeli experiences and proposals on security in mega events, anti-terror actions and introduced the concept of “safe city”, based on the Israeli surveillance of all telephone calls and web connections in Gaza. Coincidentally, it was during the event that Brazilian politicians began to publicly defend the passing of anti-terrorism legislation that could legally support actions of repression during the mega events.

Later that year, the first International Conference on Public Security, held in Tel Aviv, was attended by about 90 Brazilian authorities, security managers and businesspersons, including Hilary Medeiros, general manager of security of...
The securitisation of aid in Iraq and the failure to be guided by humanity, neutrality and impartiality

Frances Guy

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) sets out four clear humanitarian principles by which aid should be delivered: humanity; neutrality; impartiality and operational independence. 1 These foundation stones were set out in General Assembly resolution 46/182 passed in December 1991. 2 These principles are still cited today by OCHA but the nature of recent conflicts and the actions of UN Agencies and of OCHA itself seem directly to undermine the very principles by which OCHA claims to act. Perhaps it was always ambitious to expect global agencies reliant on the membership of nation states to be able to act impartially or independently. That same General Assembly resolution after all also states clearly that “humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.” 3 When the state itself is party to the conflict in Syria there are clear limits to such an approach. There is also a legitimate question about whether aid can ever be delivered neutrally in conflict where at the very least humanitarian agencies will have to negotiate with many different warring factions in order to be able to deliver assistance. The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and indeed OCHA itself use examples of just such multiple negotiations to demonstrate their neutrality but there are few organisations with such luxury. For many decades humanitarian actors have taken sides and failed that implicit test of neutrality often for good reason (aid to Eritrean and Tigryan rebels throughout the Eritrean civil war is a good example). Two things have explicitly changed, however, since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq: the direct delivery of aid by the military has returned the recipient to a colonial type relationship and the continued securitisation of aid limits both access and effectiveness.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the justifications for invasion and the testimonies of participating soldiers make clear that missions quickly changed into situations where soldiers believed they were on a humanitarian mission to help bring economic development in the case of Afghanistan or democracy in the case of Iraq. Others have argued that the creation of reconstruction teams in Afghanistan has left little legacy and failed to give space to non-military development agencies to build relationships and provide a long-term benefit. 5 The reconstruction teams were associated with the political and military goals of the occupiers and not of neutral or impartial development organisations. The situation is possibly worse in Iraq where the UN agencies depended on the protection of US soldiers until the US military’s official departure from Iraq in 2011. That means that any time any UN official moved in Baghdad and other areas outside Iraqi-Kurdistan they did so only in convoy with US troops. Any visit to local citizens, any delivery of supplies was “facilitated” by US troops. It is clear that after the 2006/7 near civil war in parts of Iraq some kind of protection for humanitarian agencies was necessary but by this time the US had turned into occupiers and so the delivery of aid was by extension tied to a perceived occupation. After US troops left, the UN provided its own security for missions but whilst the mixed nationalities of the UN and the non-aggressive stance of UN soldiers providing protection may feel different to a UN member of staff: put yourself in the role of a citizen of Fallujah or Ramadi watching an armoured convoy arrive; the logos might be different but the soldiers are still there. It hardly feels neutral or impartial. And now the UN is stuck: protection has become a self-perpetuating necessity. The more you drive around in heavily armed convoys, the more you need to do so, partly because you become an easily identifiable target. The UN has its own peculiar history in Iraq as being associated with the corruption and deprivation of the oil for food sanctions during the nineties it is universally distrusted. But the way to win over trust was arguably not to end up looking like the US army in disguise: whilst the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF remain the few international actors managing to get assistance today through to people in need in Anbar, it is still through that prism of occupation that they will be viewed. International NGOs largely entered Iraq on the backs of the US invasion and although many try hard to adhere to humanitarian principles and move around without the armed protection that UN Agencies demand, they need to work hard to avoid being associated with the occupation. The situation in Kurdistan is different, partly because of the relative stability there which meant that the UN and other international agencies have better resisted the creeping securitisation of aid. It is possible for UN Agencies to travel around Kurdistan without protection. The consequence is that nearly all the assistance being given today to Iraqis displaced as a result of the growth of the so-called Islamic state is in Iraqi Kurdistan. Latest UN figures suggest that more than 2.6 million people have been displaced in Iraq. Only about half of these are in Kurdistan. There are people in need in areas of conflict in Anbar, Nineveh and Dylal where is the impartial aid that is reaching them? I would argue that no impartial actors on the ground in Iraq dare to negotiate access with insurgent forces or even tribal leaders because humanitarian workers are now fully identified with one side of the conflict and the “protection” necessary to operate in areas of conflict accentuates the association with one side. In Syria it is possible to argue that International NGOs are striving to be impartial: working with a range of actors in both government and rebel held areas; willing to try to get aid through to those in areas controlled by all sorts of groups. The amount of assistance getting through though is very limited and the big UN agencies are thwarted by the limits of working within the confines of a system that demands government approval and often government security. Conclusion

The militarisation and subsequent securitisation of the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance in Iraq has severely limited the ability of the UN to deliver to those in most need and has undermined the global commitment to impartial aid, independently delivered. In many parts of Iraq it is no longer possible to independently deliver aid. In Syria it is also not possible to independently deliver aid, but by working with a wide range of groups, international NGOs have demonstrated that it is still possible to remain impartial and thus attempt to reach those in most need. Despite the difficulties this is closer to implementing the UN vision of aid delivered independently and guided by humanity, neutrality and impartiality than the UN itself. It also usefully demonstrates that by working through local actors it is still possible to encourage and adhere to humanitarian principles. All humanitarian organisations should continue to resist the securitisation of aid if at all possible.
“Watch Your Back” – Notes on the Militarised State in Sri Lanka

Prasanna Ratnayake

Sri Lanka has a long history of armed violence and slaughter since its independence from Britain in 1948. There were ethnic riots in 1953, ’58, ’77, ’83 and ’87; two insurrections in 1971 and 1986-90; and a 30-year civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) of the North and East and Sinhalese nationalists of the South. The war ended on 19th May 2009 with the massacre of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians. By then more than 300,000 people had become internally displaced (IDPs).

The notes here concern the 10 years from the coming to power of former human rights lawyer, Mahinda Rajapakse, in November 2005 to the downfall of his regime on 9th January 2015. A mix of political parties - Sinhala Buddhist ultranationalists, Socialists, Marxists and the Buddhist Monks’ party - had supported Rajapakse’s candidacy. From the moment he became president, virtually over night, we entered the period of what would become a totally militarised police state. We woke up one morning to find Army checkpoints, military vehicles, police and soldiers everywhere. Cynthia Enloe has described it well, “Militarization is the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria.” (Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000.) 2005 was the third year of a ceasefire in the civil war, mediated and monitored by the Norwegians. There had been a few rounds of peace talks but little progress had been made and it was generally known that the full in fighting was being used by both sides to prepare for the next round.

Photo: Demonstration against war disappearances

In the South, with the coming of the Rajapakses, the militarisation was not only seen on the streets. The entire mass media changed tone - militarisation became mainstream and popular culture became military culture. Instead of news of peace talks and peace dividends, artists, singers, actors and fashion models painted, sang, danced, paraded and made patriotic advertisements. Film clips of previous LTTE outrages - for example, a bomb blast in 1987 - were broadcast over and over again to rev up fear, hatred and insecurity amongst the Sinhalese, preparing them for the return to war.

A competition show for military personnel was modelled on American Idol – who could sing the best patriotic song? A TV ad showed a heavily pregnant woman giving her seat on the bus to a soldier. Babies and kids had camouflage outfits and women wore camouflage scarves. Private individuals and companies collected huge sums to guarantee the welfare of our soldiers. Recruitment soared. Religious leaders were shown on the TV News blessing the newly armed contingents. Civilian defence forces were set up in Buddhist temples and Montessori schools became coordinating centres for ‘National Strength’ programmes.

At the same time, the LTTE, continued their already severe military rule over their own people; recruiting child soldiers, monitoring all civilian activity, controlling banks, postal services, transport, schools, their own legal system, buying more military hardware and sending suicide bombers to the South.

Within a year the war resumed. It took the Sinhalese forces three years to definitively crush the Tamil Tigers. President Mahinda described this slaughter as a “humanitarian operation” with zero civilian casualties: “Our troops carried a gun in one hand and a copy of the human rights charter in the other.” That this operation involved deceit, extrajudicial executions, massacre and innumerable crimes against humanity has been well documented in foreign news coverage and in a UN Report that claimed at least 40,000 civilians had been continued on page 10...

Photo: Demonstration against war disappearances

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State militarisation

Photo: Colombo university, 2012
...continued from page 9.

killed in the final battle. Other agencies claimed the toll was much higher. These allegations led to repeated demands that Sri Lanka submit to an international war crimes enquiry.

Militarisation did not end with the final victory. A few months into 2010, war hero President Rajapakse called an election and easily won himself a second term. He made a major cabinet reshuffle. His brother Gotabaya, one of the masterminds of the war, continued as Secretary of Defence and the Ministry of Defence took over the portfolio of the Urban Development Authority.

The Urban Development Authority used soldiers to work on the new City Beautification Project. This involved clearing slums so that the land could be sold to Chinese and Indian investors, creating and managing public parks, playgrounds, shopping malls, tourist hotels, restaurants, beauty salons and other developments.

By order of the Executive President, Mahinda Rajapakse, all University students were required to take a course in military discipline and all school principals had to undergo military training, where they were made colonels.

Ex-military personnel took over the civil and foreign services and in the cities men loitered on the pavements every 100 meters monitoring who and what was going on. They wore civilian clothes but still had their army boots. ‘White van abductions’, which had begun in 2005, grabbed increasing numbers of people off the streets, with journalists being especially targeted. Some simply disappeared, the tortured corpses of others would be found a day or so later. Suspects were imprisoned without trial and the chief justice was sacked for a ruling against the president. Extreme violence was normalised and the regime held all of us in its grip of state terror.

Hundreds of journalists and human rights activists fled the country. The national defence budget was bigger than it had been during the war.

In the conquered Tamil regions of the North and East, Sinhalese military personnel replaced all the governors, local administrators and police in Jaffna, there was a soldier for every 10 local residents and the demographics were changing. The government organised War Tourism trips for Southerners to come view the victory monument, the conquered territory and the traumatised people.

On 9th January this year, almost as a miracle, the Rajapakse regime was voted out. The new government has moved carefully and cautiously to begin the complex process of trying to bring sanity to a fragile, cowed and exhausted country. The aim is to restate law and order, heal the fractured relationship between ethnic and religious communities, build trust in government and civil society from the ground up and recover from the tsunami of injustice and cruelty.

Sensible and encouraging moves have been made in the past three months. I want to believe that the enormous work of transformation needed will continue; that we can have a future of peace, reconciliation and coherence. To be honest, after a lifetime of brutalisation and horror, though I have always believed in the resilience and creativity of my people, I am afraid to have too much confidence. I do not want to end with this, but Cynthia Enloe has again said it well. ‘What has been militarised can be demilitarised. What has been demilitarised can be remilitarised’.

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is organically related to the military influence. Indeed, as Birz Berksenoy states, it was following the military coup of 1980 that;

"the police entered a phase of expansion and militarisation, during which it was structurally and legally strengthened with the help of the military, and it began to apply violence more frequently and intensively via newly established paramilitary units."

I would argue that in highlighting these deep-rooted organic relations between the military and the police, I am also revealing the current state of militarisation in the country. After more than a decade of government by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, one can hardly deny the fact that the military elite’s power over Parliament and civil bureaucracy has been eliminated. However, this does not necessarily mean that we can now celebrate the victory of democracy and individual liberties in the country, as many conservatives and liberals have been claiming. Can we really conclude that the retreat of the military as an institution from the political sphere has created a new ‘militarism-free’ zone for politics? The notorious human rights record of the year-old AKP government gives little cause for optimism in this regard. During its period in power, AKP has made some far-reaching changes in the law, expanding the police’s extrajudicial power, loosening controls over its use of force and making it less accountable to judicial scrutiny. It initiated the Law of Misdemeanour in 2004, which increased police powers of intervention in citizens’ daily lives via certain ‘crime prevention’ measures. In 2006, it made important changes to the Anti-Terror Law which allowed state authorities further rights leading to violations and restrictions on liberties. Finally it enacted the new Domestic Security Bill which significantly expanded the police’s extrajudicial powers, by means of legislation more consistent with a military authoritarian regime. Given all the changes introduced by this government then, what can one conclude about AKP’s so-called success in terms of demilitarising Turkish politics?

I would argue there has been no demilitarisation, simply another form of militarisation disguised by an institutional power game between the military elites on the one side, and a neoliberal-conservative government ready to appropriate the legacy of the military coup, namely the police force, on the other. The latter has won the game, at least for the time being. It seems like now it is AKP’s turn to create its own ‘national security state’ which it is accomplishing by using the police whose ethos and organisational structure is inherited from the 1980 military coup. With this in mind, the ultimate winner in my view has not been any particular group or political party but – maybe more pessimistically - the mindset brought in by the military coup in 1980.
The New Security Bill and the Military Ethos of Policing in Turkey

Semih Sapmaz

A new domestic security bill giving draconian powers to the police has recently been put into force in Turkey. Expanding police power enormously and granting the police some extrajudicial authority, the bill does not allow citizens appropriate measures with which to protect themselves from abuse of this power. Widely criticised by the opposition both within and outside Parliament, the new bill grants wider search powers to the police, gives them extrajudicial authority to detain, and expands their control over the use of firearms. While defining new crimes for protestors such as covering the face or using slingshots - with prison sentences up to 4 years. While - unsurprisingly - the government defended the bill as a guarantee for maintaining public order, the opposition declared it a manifestation of the ruling party’s ‘police state’. I will argue here that whereas the content of the bill may be new, the ethos behind it is long-established in Turkish politics; that is the ‘military ethos’. Furthermore, I will contend that each and every piece of legislation increasing police powers should be understood as part of another form of the militarisation that characterises AKP rule, police militarisation. To clarify this point, I will start with a brief description of the relationship between these terms.

The Militarisation of the Police

Militarism, to briefly use Enloe’s terms, is about “seeing the world as a dangerous place best approached with militaristic attitudes,” which are based on a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force. Although Turkish ‘military as an institution plays a central role in this process, state instruments reproducing this mindset extend well beyond the barracks. The police, as a non-military state institution with the capacity to utilise physical force in the regulation of interpersonal relations on a daily basis, become highly instrumental in this process. This is particularly so in the context of liberal democratic states where the military’s capacity to intervene in citizens’ daily life is exceptionally restricted, and thus the police’s instrumental value in the normalisation of the ‘military ethos’ beyond the barracks deserves particular attention. Police militarisation in this context has huge implications for the militarisation of society in general.

What exactly is meant by the term ‘militarisation of the police’? According to Costa and Medeiros, it takes two forms: internal and external militarisation. While the former refers to “the degree to which a police force adopts a militaristic ideology and organisational structure”, the latter refers to “the extent to which the military exerts influence over police organisations.” In addition, police militarisation also refers to the adoption of a ‘military ethos’ in its operations. The term connotes the police’s increasing reliance on ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ rather than ‘proportionality’ in using force. With the relaxing of controls on police operations together with widening police powers over the use of force, the Turkish case provides a good example of this process. Having established this framework, we can now focus on the Turkish case in practice.

Police Militarisation in Turkey

Recent research on the subculture of the Turkish police reveals that ‘nationalist-conservatism’, which amounts to “fervent endorsement of Turkishness and Sunni Islam,” is the dominant political orientation among the members of the organisation. It is in relation to this ideological affiliation that many segments of society, such as the Left, the Kurds or the Alevi, are ‘emised’ in police practice and discourse. Dissidents are reduced to ‘internal enemies’ plotting against the state and considered undeserving of the rights enjoyed by ‘proper citizens’. The Turkish police’s notorious record of disproportionate use of force is a manifestation of this situation where protestors can be deprived of their most basic rights - including their right to life - in the interests of protecting public order. This ‘dehumanises’ dissident subjects, reducing them to enemies to be defeated, similar to a battlefield atmosphere where one’s constitutional rights no longer apply.

Alongside this ideological background, the practice of military ethos can also be traced in the organisational structure of the Turkish police. Rapid Action Units (RAU – Çevik Kuvvet) and the Special Operation Teams (SOTs – Özel Harekat Timleri) are two of the most obvious examples of this organisational militarisation. Established by the military government following the 1980 coup, RAU have given legal powers to take reactive and proactive measures in response to demonstrations and illegal acts in public spaces; they are equipped with advanced weapons such as tear gas bombs, machine guns and water cannons and have certain discretionary powers over the use of force, which were widened even further with the new security bill. The SOTs - equipped with heavy arms and acting in collaboration with the military - were established by this same 1980 government, for the specific purpose of fighting against Kurdish rebels in the south eastern provinces. As the formation of these two new units shows, the ‘ethos’ of the police in Turkey continued on page 10...


Every year, 15th May is International Conscientious Objection day.

Around the world campaigners will be remembering the generations who refused to go to war, and raising awareness of the many who continue to be persecuted and imprisoned for refusing to kill and be part of military structures.

To see a listing of the different events and actions being taken by WRI affiliates visit www.wri-irg.org/co-day-2015.

A poster for the police in Turkey. The caption translates as “I am with goodness, lawfulness, mercifulness: I am with you.”

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New in the WRI webshop

War Resisters’ International offers a range of merchandise via its webshop. These and other books can be ordered online — and some are even available for reading online or downloading as PDF.

Through articles, images, survey data and interviews, Sowing Seeds: The Militarisation of Youth and How to Counter It documents the seeds of war that are planted in the minds of young people in many different countries. However, it also explores the seeds of resistance to this militarisation that are being sown resiliently and creatively by numerous people. We hope the book will help to disseminate these latter seeds. It is not just a book for peace and antimilitarist activists: it is a book for parents and grandparents, teachers, youth workers, and young people themselves.

Author(s)/editor(s):
Owen Everett
Publisher:
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Year published:
2013
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COs are generally seen as male — as are soldiers. This book breaks with this assumption. Women conscientiously object to military service and militarism. Not only in countries which conscript women — such as Eritrea and Israel — but also in countries without conscription of women. In doing so, they redefine antimilitarism from a feminist perspective, opposing not only militarism, but also a form of antimilitarism that creates the male conscientious objector as the ‘hero’ of antimilitarist struggle. This anthology includes contributions by women conscientious objectors and activists from Britain, Colombia, Eritrea, Israel, Paraguay, South Korea, Turkey, and the USA, plus documents and statements.

Edited by Ellen Elster and Majken Jul Sørensen, Preface by Cynthia Enloe

Social change doesn’t just happen. It’s the result of the work of committed people striving for a world of justice and peace. This handbook work gestates in groups of cells of activists, in discussions, in training sessions, in reflecting on previous experiences, in planning, in experimenting and in learning from others. Preparing ourselves for our work for social justice is key to its success. There is no definitive recipe for successful nonviolent actions and campaigns. This handbook, however, is a series of resources that can inspire and support your own work, especially if you adapt the resources to your own needs and context.

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