The Intifada: from violence to more violence

Overall situation

The thrust of the peace process that resulted in the 1993 Oslo agreement was to bring the Palestinians and Israelis to an interim negotiated settlement. It set out steps that focused on building mutual trust between the two peoples. After the signing of the Oslo agreement, which included the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), there was a gradual implementation of the terms of the agreement and the beginning of Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. Before the assassination of Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, hopes were high that a settlement was possible and a move from interim negotiation to final status negotiation would soon follow. The golden era of the peace process did not last long. At the high point in 1995-96, support for the peace process peaked at 80% and support for violence against Israeli targets dropped to 20%.

The implementation of the agreements slowed or halted altogether after Rabin's assassination. The delays eroded the level of trust towards both the Israeli government and the PNA, signs of that erosion began to manifest themselves in Palestinian society. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the Oslo Agreement did not immediately address the issues that are major causes of conflict: the status of Jerusalem, an end of occupation and the recognition of a Palestinian state, the situation of Palestinian refugees, economic improvement, guaranteed access to water, and the Israeli settlements. Throughout this entire period, new Israeli settlements were created continuously while existing settlements were expanded.

The September 28, 2000 visit of right-wing politician Ariel Sharon, then the leader of the opposition party, to the al Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem sparked the second Intifada of Al-Aqsa in that month. The visit enraged a Palestinian public already disillusioned by the failure of the peace process over a period of several years to produce an end to Israeli military occupation. Within a few days, there were widespread and violent confrontations with the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza Strip--and within Israel--resulting in many casualties and deaths, initially among Palestinians. These confrontations were the start of a process of escalating acts of violence and increasing repression--a violent cycle of action-reaction that continues to this day.

The characteristic of this Intifada in contrast with previous Palestinian confrontations with the Israeli occupation is the extraordinarily high number of civilian casualties within both the Palestinian and Israeli societies. This was due to an excessive use of violence and the Israeli military assault in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has been argued that the use live ammunition in the first months of the Intifada by the Israeli forces, causing many deaths and injuries and the use of arms by Palestinians have terrified the Palestinian street, deterring them from joining popular protest.

Militarization by the PNA

After the first four months, the uprising took a turn away from popular grassroots protest to sporadic armed struggle--later to low-level guerrilla tactics including suicide bombing. While there is no symmetry between the occupier and the occupied--the relationship is one of that between oppressor and victim, the militarization of the Intifada by Palestinians has been a strategic miscalculation. The violence of the powerful Israeli occupation army using live ammunition, tanks and helicopter gunship and even F-16 fighter jets, demonstrates who has the military power. Militarizing the second uprising has been ineffective in fighting Israel and is even counterproductive because of the might of the Israeli retaliatory measures. The struggle became even more difficult when attacks started to target civilian and not concentrate on targets within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The militarization of the uprising did provide the PNA security forces with an opportunity to prove their significance at a time when had not been paid for several months due to a lack of funds. In January 2001, the PNA security forces executed two Palestinians, for the first time, for their collaboration with the Israeli intelligence service. This incident highlights again the crucial role of PNA security in maintaining order. The empowerment of the security forces in Palestinian society over civil and political movements has given them the upper hand--a seemingly free hand to abuse their power. As a result, many sectors of Palestinian society are excluded from participating actively in the uprising, undermining the democratic process. The exclusion of civil society organizations has had a particular impact on the participation of women and secular organizations and shifted power toward religious groups. In fact, the PNA has put enormous pressure on NGOs and tightened its control through the introduction of laws and regulations. Since the Oslo agreement in 1993, political parties have been sidelined, leaving the PNA to make decisions on all aspects of Palestinian life.

After 1993, the NGO sector grew significantly in number but not in its influence on Palestinian society. There was a general withdrawal from activism by NGOs and political parties who were unable to sustain the same level of engagement that they had during the Intifada. The flow of funding from international organizations to Palestinian NGOs and the imposition of their agendas and work methods further damaged their reputation and their credibility in Palestinian society. NGOs became like "shops," aiming in reality to make a profit and secure income for their staff. They became oriented toward and driven largely by funding agencies and their externally-decided priorities.

As a consequence, civil society failed to develop a credible opposition against both the corruption within the PNA and the struggle against Israeli occupation. In fact, many civil society organizations were benefiting from the situation. Using its financial resources the PNA was able to secure jobs for the "boys" in the PNA institutions and to offer employment in the various security forces. In this way, the PNA led by Arafat was able to co-opt the opposition in civil society.

Nonviolence and empowerment

The use of armed confrontations with the Israeli army represents a failure to learn from the past--most recently the 1987 Intifada. Nonviolent action during the first Intifada robbed Israel of its military superiority over the Palestinian civilians and caused serious damage to the image of Israel internationally. Grassroots participation and the formation of popular committees were both sources of empowerment for the whole population. Mutual support systems established in local neighborhoods helped Palestinians face the hardships caused by army-imposed closure of the West Bank and Gaza. These systems also proved invaluable by inspiring confidence in the security they provided for people living the Intifada day-to-day. By contrast, it is very difficult to develop strategy of action against the occupation during the current Intifada, even though there is already process of disengagement form Israel.

The corruption within the PNA ranks and the public mistrust towards the Palestinian leadership has created an atmosphere of apathy and feelings of hopelessness. The PNA has failed to convince the public of their transparency or accountability.

Internationals working in Palestine are some of the few to call for nonviolent action against the Israeli occupation. Over the past year they have arranged some very successful, if small scale, actions. And in many situations Palestinians and Israelis from the peace camp organized sit-ins and other protest activities. My own experience of these actions has been that they are very powerful and render the army completely powerless. Attempts by the military to use stun bombs, tear gas and physical violence against protesters proved chaotic and pathetic, while in other situation the Israeli forces were brutal with the protesters. During the last few weeks during March and April 2002, joint demonstrations organized by Palestinians from Israel and Israeli Jews were meet with a vicious response by the Israeli security forces. The role of the international solidarity movement with the Palestinians in recent months has been critical in helping provide protection and aid for the civilian population. It is important to strengthen this movement and form a joint strategy based on nonviolent civil action. The work of the international solidarity movement with the Palestinians is more important than at any time in the past.

My conclusion is that given the brutal use of force by the Israeli army and total dehumanization of the Palestinians it would be completely unrealistic and dangerous for Palestinians alone to use nonviolent action. However, there is a great potential for this approach only if it is used jointly and in cooperation with the Israeli peace movement and the international solidarity activists with Palestine.

There is no doubt that there is no military solution to Palestinian-Israeli conflict and that the only way forward is through negotiations. However, this dialogue must recognize the Palestinians' need for freedom and justice.

Responding to Conflict, 1046 Bristol Road, Birmingham B29 6LJ, UK. E mail: marwan@respond.org