Go to Stephen Zunes' article "Nonviolence against Apartheid" on the WRI website or go to the comment page index

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Undoubtedly the increased use of nonviolent methods in the 1980s increased the effectiveness of the struggle against apartheid. However, most of those in bodies such as the United Democratic Front or the trade unionists in COSATU did not see a conflict between nonviolent and armed resistance. Rather they would stress the need for unity and of a range of methods.

Prominent South African advocates of nonviolence did not counterpose non-armed methods to armed struggle. In fact, they were rather suspicious of anybody who did because it was clear that external governments, above all the USA, wanted to bring into being an alternative opposition to apartheid to the Communist-influenced ANC.

The ANC itself was fully behind the greater priority given to mass-based non-armed methods in the 1980s - indeed many of the local leaders of such struggles were (secretly and illegally) ANC members. Moreover, while not abandoning armed struggle, they did not seek to intensify it. Youth who wanted to enlist in MK, the ANC's armed wing, would find themselves sent to training camps outside the country to "cool their heels" and learn about strategy. Hence the MK's role was largely symbolic.

I can quite easily believe that, as Stephen suggests, the greater emphasis on non-armed methods attracted more support among the US population and made the movement for economic sanctions more powerful. But in many parts of the world there already existed strong anti-apartheid movements supporting "all means necessary" to end apartheid.

South Africa was not able to take part in the Olympics or major competitions of rugby and cricket, the sports most important to the white community, from the 1970s onwards. At the same time a few businesses withdrew from South Africa, others looked for forms of "constructive engagement", and others merely tried to brush up their image - but they felt the force of the mobilisation of international public opinion against them.

I was particularly involved in the campaign in Britain to boycott Barclays bank, which had a powerful impact and ultimately brought about Barclays' withdrawal. Our campaign involved dissuading individuals (especially students who the bank was courting) from opening accounts with Barclays, persuading others to close accounts, persuading institutions such as churches, unions and municipalities to close their accounts, attending shareholders' meetings, and so on. It involved a lot of public education about apartheid, and in particular building up a consciousness of the institutional support for apartheid.

As a nonviolent activist, I was one of those who advocated these boycotts as a practical and nonviolent response to apartheid. I was given a hard time by advocates of armed struggle who said we'd be more effective raising funds to buy arms - something entirely symbolic - and I think that that type of attitude certainly didn't help the growth of active opposition to apartheid. Regrettably, I also had cause to complain about some British pacifists - for instance, the Quakers and the Peace Pledge Union - whose preaching that nonviolence was an alternative to armed struggle was rather undermined by their failure to stop banking with Barclays!

Howard Clark