Social defence against coups: the case of Fiji

On 14 May 1987, the elected government of Dr Timoci Bavadra was forcibly removed by a military coup, led by then Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka. Bavadra's coalition government, consisting of the predominantly Indian-supported National Federation Party and the newly formed (1985) Fiji National Labour Party, represented the first substantial change in government since Fiji became independent in 1970. For 17 years the Alliance Party, a multi-racial grouping of three sub-associations for Indians, Fijians and other races (General Electors) had ruled Fiji under the leadership of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Bavadra's Coalition outlined a number of proposed changes in policy, introduced small but significant social welfare benefits in its short time in office, and promised to investigate government corruption. More controversial before and after the elections, was its plan to reintroduce a ban on nuclear ship visits, a policy held by Fiji until 1983. The Coalition intended to be non-aligned. In contrast, Mara and his Alliance government were known to be friendly and supportive of US interests in the South Pacific region.
Vanessa Griffen is a member of the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group and editor of Women, Development and Empowerment: a Pacific feminist perspective (Asian and Pacific Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1989).

Supporters of the coup used race to justify the removal of the Bavadra government, which was described as "Indian dominated" because the majority of its electoral support came from the National Federation Party, supported by Indian cane farmers and the middle class. However, the Bavadra victory was carried by its winning four Fijian national urban seats indicating some Fijian discontent with the Alliance, the predominantly Fijian-supported party. [Under the 1970 Constitution, Fiji had a complicated system of communal (racial) and national electorates.] Although the Alliance conceded defeat, destabilisation activities were instigated involving key members of the party and its Fijian supporters and not restrained by the party leadership. Racial fears were whipped up -- with Bavadra painted as a stooge of Indians; Fijians were warned of a loss of their lands and the undermining of the chiefs under the new government. Race was a significant factor in mobilising support for the coup and racism remains a central part of maintaining military control.

In September 1987, just when a peace agreement had been reached between Mara and Bavadra -- the former and deposed prime ministers respectively -- and agreed by the Governor-General, Rabuka staged a second coup. He abrogated the 1970 Independence Constitution and declared Fiji a republic with a President as head of state. He established a military government, appointing ministers from the army and the Fijian Taukei Movement. In December, he transferred power back to an "interim government" headed by Ratu Mara, with Rabuka himself as both Minister for Home Affairs, until September 1989, and head of the army. This interim government arose from and depends on military support. Attempts to formulate a constitution entrenching Fijian political dominance continue, turning non-Fijians into second class citizens. The current climate is characterised by the militarisation of Fiji, the escalating use of violence to solve disputes in the absence of a properly constituted political system, diminishing respect for the rule of law, and an abiding insecurity about human and political rights under the proposed constitution.

People's responses to the coups

The people's response to the first (May) and second (September) coups differed. In May, response was motivated by feelings of shock at the military takeover and anger at the removal of an elected government. There had been high hopes of reform under Bavadra; for supporters, and even though those uneasy at the end of the Alliance's 17-year reign, there were hopes of progressive changes and a new political climate.

An early response to the coup was to gather at the two places where the elected government ministers were being held prisoners. When the ministers were separated along racial lines and Indian MPs moved to Borron House, a crowd gathered there. The day after the coup a small group of relatives and friends gathered at the Prime Minister's residence where the army was holding Coalition ministers. This gathering grew into a more conscious protest vigil and show of support with the arrival of other supporters -- a woman activist and a trade union leader were instrumental in passing the word around that people should be encouraged to meet at the site the next day (Saturday).

Meanwhile, anonymous newsletters produced by individuals working in small groups appeared overnight, commenting on the coup and addressing myths about the Bavadra government and its intentions. With the daily newspapers -- the Fiji Times and the Fiji Sun -- closed for a week after the coup, these political leaflets were distributed in various parts of Suva aiming to inform and educate the public to counter the pro-coup rationale and propaganda coming from the government-controlled radio and coup supporters.

On Saturday, two days after the May coup, a large crowd gathered at the Prime Minister's residence. The soldiers guarding the house and moving in and out of the short cul-de-sac then put up roadblocks to control access. There was no overt violence towards the crowd. On Sunday, however, when a prayer meeting was planned, soldiers dispersed the crowd gathered outside where the ministers were being held. Led by a well-known woman activist, the crowd -- now also consisting of students from the nearby University of the South Pacific -- marched to Suva city centre. This was the first protest march against the coup. In Suva, police arrested the march leader and she was subsequently detained for four days.

One week after the coup the release of the ministers and resumption of reporting by the press provided a lull in which people were able to absorb the first factual details of the coup and who was involved. The Governor-General of Fiji had adopted an apparently mediating stance by assuming executive powers and appointing an interim administration. The military was in evidence with roadblocks and key parts of the city were under army control.

A significant event in this early period that was to affect people's willingness to show opposition to the coups was a racial attack on Indians attending a prayer meeting in Albert Park. Indigenous Fijians in support of the coup attacked men, women and children, chasing them through the city streets. The spread of public knowledge of this attack had a strong effect -- inciting anger and also a sense of fear and horror. To be noted also was Fijian support for the attackers. A key element in controlling popular opposition had been violence and the threat of violence by the Fijian Taukei Movement, indigenous supporters of the coups. Racial attacks and the firebombing of Indian shops in central Suva were an intimidation tactic aimed at forcing a more extremist position on the Fijian leadership as well as intimidating the Indian population generally.

The Back to Early May Movement was a well organised and sustained social defence group formed to counter the effect of the coup and influence the political deliberations of the Governor-General. Composed of individuals from a diverse range of backgrounds -- church leaders, leading public servants, well-known individuals -- it characterised itself as being a non-party group of concerned citizens. The movement set out a number of simply stated demands, basically requesting a "Return to early May" (the days before the coup) and suggesting a conciliation process and the formation of a government of national reconciliation. The Back to Early May Movement advertised its demands in the newspapers and organised a signature campaign intended to get a number of citizens to show commitment and support. Despite harassment, it gathered 100,000 signatures calling on the Governor-General to pursue efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution to the coup crisis. However the Governor-General's delay in making any response or giving any recognition to the campaign soon led to disillusionment by Movement leaders, who were forced to acknowledge that other political forces held power and there was no intention of listening to public opinion. The Back to Early May Movement had been successful in focusing public awareness and soliciting citizens' support for conciliation. It represented a broad-based citizens' group responding to the coup: but the lack of recognition for quite an impressive signature campaign led to the conclusion that the Governor-General and the political leadership were impervious to popular influence.

At the same time, the Coalition Party under the leadership of Dr Bavadra had begun an education and information campaign called Operation Sunrise. Its main aim was to counter army propaganda disseminated amongst Fijians. Parliamentarians travelled with Bavadra to Fijian villages, where meetings were held to explain the interests behind the coups and to respond to propaganda about Libyan influence, the 1970 Constitution, Fijian land rights and the threat posed by Indians to Fijian land and customs. Other meetings were also organised in different centres, drawing some thousands of supporters. The Coalition party focused mainly on explaining the coup and did not direct any action that may be taken by its supporters.

The newspapers played an important role also in analysing events and reporting on developments. The Fiji Sun in particular printed critical editorials signed by the publishers; and the letters columns of both papers were a forum for continuing expressions of opposition -- countered by letters of support -- for the coups, the army and the interim administration.

The second coup: learning the lessons of militarisation

The second coup in September was qualitatively different from the first: it established full military control. Rabuka appointed his own cabinet and the military presence was more seriously felt by all citizens. Roadblocks were established throughout the country but particularly in the urban centre of Suva. Motorists were harassed, cars thoroughly searched. In this period, a curfew and again a news blackout were imposed. The Sunday Observance decree, imposing restrictions on movement and activities on Sunday, was severely enforced. Ordinary Fijians for the first time also experienced the military controls: curfew-breakers and Sunday Observance offenders were on occasion made to crawl on hands and knees to the Central Police Station. Indian citizens were still the prime targets: women washing had clothes trampled in the mud; even children playing were punished, with incidents when noses were scraped on concrete. These experiences were deeply traumatic, shocking and showing a level of repression and human rights abuses never experienced before in Fiji. The response of people in this context was predictably different.

The second coup represented the army turning its attention to controlling the population and quelling political opposition among party organisers, union officials, academics and other individuals. Coalition party organisers who had worked amongst the farmers were identified, taken by soldiers, beaten and harassed. One view is that these attacks in the second coup directed at rank and file organisers of the Coalition effectively broke up the party's organising activities by taking away grassroots organisers.

Overall, the experience of the second coup showed people in Fiji the raw face of army control: a curfew was established and enforced; roadblocks, checks of vehicles and harassment of people became a common occurrence. A news blackout again produced a spate of leaflets -- but discovery of materials in cars became a more serious risk. The enforcement of the Sunday Decree established a closer degree of militarycivilian contact and repression; the Decree was particularly supported by the fundamentalist Methodist church section of the Taukei Movement.

The "interim" government set up in December 1987 was given the task of formulating a Constitution for the republic of Fiji and returning the country to constitutional government. The draft constitution supported by the army and the Great Council of Chiefs gives Fijians a guaranteed majority of seats and a permanent monopoly on power: racial electorates and chiefly power are combined in a system of government compared by some commentators to the kind of racial separation found under apartheid.

The curtailment of the rights of assembly and other political freedoms following the coups had meant restrictions on political organising and activities against the coups. Permits are required to hold meetings and the state has withheld these from the Coalition and other groups considered as opposed to the regime. A planned march by women and children organised by two women's organisation had to be cancelled for lack of a permit. On the other hand, the Taukei Movement and other coup support groups, including some factions within the Methodist Church, are allowed to hold meetings and make political statements. Groups refused a permit have been told that the police cannot vouch for their safety from attack by these pro-coup elements.

Official repression is only part of the equation in Fiji. The threat of violence and intimidation from non-official sources is an impediment to social defence action. Racism and the threat of a violent response from citizens supportive of the coups is an important feature of repression and control in Fiji.

Instances of people resisting militarisation and voicing opposition to the regime have continued to occur. When Rabuka's promotional film No Other Way was premiered in Suva, a small group of women organised a protest outside the theatre, despite the presence of the police and a crowd of onlookers presumed to be supporters of the film and its main character, the coup leader. The protesters were removed by the police, held in the police station for some hours, but not actually charged.

Over a period of time, however, a series of control measures contributed to a suspension of people's protest: the increased army presence, decrees limiting human rights and rights to assembly, the existence of a black list used to prevent certain individuals leaving the country, and the introduction of an Internal Security Decree in mid-1988 (since removed, but it can be re-introduced) which gave the regime wide powers to detain individuals without trial and allowing security forces to kill citizens in the performance of their duties. When the army presence, including its use of roadblocks, were reduced, most people -- particularly in Suva -- were anxious to return to ordinary, peaceful pre-coup life. The emotional upheavals of the coups and all that the country experienced of military controls and human rights abuses meant that there is now a conscious value placed on pursuing a routine life and activities.

The Coalition has continued to be the major organised voice of opposition to the regime. Its attention is presently focused on rebutting the racist draft Constitution. Recently, an International Women's Day celebration in Lautoka was used to express women's feelings about the post-coup society and the effects on Indian women in particular. Indian students from the University of the South Pacific attending a Holi celebration in Suva took religious leaders by surprise by voicing their opposition to political events and condemning Indian inaction; effigies of Indian collaborators with the regime were burnt. These responses were relatively new in the present climate of a minimum of expression against the post-coup reality.

In small ways, individuals and groups continue to defend the idea of a humane and just society in Fiji. The Peace and Justice Committee of the Catholic has made firm statements on social and political issues; the YWCA and other women's groups have continued to draw attention to the social and economic impacts of militarisation and violence in society on women. Educative processes continued to be given priority.

Nonviolence and violence

The potential for a violent response in Fiji cannot be ignored. Understanding of or sympathy for peaceful resistance is not present in all quarters. Some responses would be violent if it were not so clear that the outcome would be unsuccessful and result in more violence and bloodshed. The lack of a violent response in Fiji is due to strategic considerations rather than a rejection of violent action in principle. The provocation posed by direct violence, unjust constitutional provisions and racism is very strong. The place of nonviolent social defence in Fiji's situation is an issue that is open to debate. The present depressing facts that citizens and political groups face is the well-entrenched power of the military, its central role in Fiji politics and the extent of militarisation of Fiji society along racial lines. The social desire to redress, defend, or correct this trend of militarisation does exist. The challenge presented is how people in Fiji can respond to militarisation and racism and defend their beliefs and protect social values in the face of militarisation.

Some general points on social defence and nonviolent action drawn from the experience in Fiji

• Coups are a shocking experience in societies where the military has been invisible or uninvolved in political and public activity.
• The racial element has been an important issue sharpening the violence in Fiji; racism as a rationale for the coups has spread political support for the military to civilian supporters. Racial violence by ordinary citizens against each other is the single most important stimulus for violence occurring in Fiji.
• Military and police responses are only part of the equation when assessing responses to people's nonviolent social defence activities. In Fiji, the militant Taukei Movement and the politically-oriented religious fundamentalist faction of the Methodist Church are also potential aggressors whose intimidating actions are difficult to predict.
• The use of force, controls on movement, beatings and harassment of citizens and use of repressive laws have cumulatively led to an awareness of the nature of military rule in Fiji. The choice at the moment for maintaining peaceful 'ordinary' times following two years of upheaval has contributed to people's withdrawing from very active public opposition to the regime. The spectre of racial violence is a significant deterrent.
• The militarisation of the police force is a subject often neglected. The role and function of the police force has been undermined by the coups. The police no longer enforce the law equally; they had to recognise the superior power of the military. The change in top police officers after the coups contribution to militarisation of the police force. Defence actions are ambivalently viewed by the police, who respond with violence or who appear under pressure to conform to military-inspired repression or harassment of political activists or protesters.
• The passage of time produced different responses to the effects of the coups. Intervening periods of repression and violence followed by military control being well-established have depressed nonviolent social defence actions in a small state where family pressures, limited employment options also act to restrain political oppositions by individuals after a time.
• A key question in Fiji is the Constitution. Is it an issue around which action should be organised? Are other issues more likely to mobilise people? If the constitution represents the future political system and society planned for Fiji, could people if organised manage to effectively stop a racist constitution being adopted. Should other issues be focused on by organisers, eg military rule and what it means; militarisation and evidence of its penetration of Fiji society; racism and its detrimental effect on people? Could actions be more effectively organised around presentation of issues along these lines?